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HOW UNIVERSITY TITLE IX 
ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER DISCIPLINE 
PROCESSES (PROBABLY) DISCRIMINATE 
AGAINST MINORITY STUDENTS 
By Ben Trachtenberg* 
This Article argues that university discipline procedures likely discriminate 
against minority students and that increasingly muscular Title IX enforcement—
launched with the best of intentions in response to real problems—almost cer-
tainly exacerbates yet another systemic barrier to racial justice and equal access 
to educational opportunities. Unlike elementary and secondary schools, universi-
ties do not keep publicly available data on the demographics of students subject-
ed to institutional discipline, which prevents evaluation of possible disparate ra-
cial impact in higher education. Further, several aspects of the university 
disciplinary apparatus—including broad and vague definitions of offenses, lim-
ited access to legal counsel, and irregular procedures—increase the risk that mi-
nority students will suffer disproportionate suspensions and other punishment. 
This Article brings needed attention to an understudied aspect of Title IX en-
forcement and raises concerns about the potential effects of implicit bias. While 
many commentators and courts have addressed whether university disciplinary 
procedures mistreat men—or, instead, even now provide inadequate protection 
for college women—few observers have discussed possible racial implications, 
which may explain (and be explained by) the current lack of data. Outside the 
context of sex-discrimination cases, university discipline procedures for quotidian 
matters such as plagiarism and alcohol abuse likely exhibit similar racial biases. 
This Article argues that the U.S. Department of Education should use its au-
thority under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to require that colleges and 
universities immediately begin collecting and publishing the sort of data already 
reported by elementary and secondary schools, thereby allowing observers to as-
sess the scope of disparate impact in campus discipline processes. 
                                                        
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. I would like to thank 
everyone who has read earlier drafts and provided comments, including candid confidential 
responses from university presidents and other officials dedicated to promoting equal oppor-
tunity on campus. Among others, I appreciate feedback from Anne Alexander, Tina Bloom, 
Sam Halabi, Kevin McDonald, Allen Sessoms, Tommy Tobin, Mark Yudof, various 
Trachtenbergs, and the Drake Law School faculty who attended my August 2017 presenta-
tion in Des Moines. 
18 NEV. L.J. 107, TRACHTENBERG - FINAL 12/14/17  5:53 PM 
108 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:107  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 109	
I. DOCUMENTED INSTANCES OF DISPARATE RACIAL IMPACT AT 
UNIVERSITIES .................................................................................................. 112	
II. POINTS OF COMPARISON: ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS, SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 
AND REAL COURTS .......................................................................................... 115	
 A.	 Racial Injustice in Elementary and Secondary School 
Discipline ..................................................................................... 115	
 B.	 Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System ........................... 118	
 C.	 Common Themes to Examine at the University Level ................. 121	
III.	 HOW THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF UNIVERSITY TITLE IX 
ENFORCEMENT ENHANCES RISKS OF DISPARATE IMPACT ON THE BASIS OF 
RACE ............................................................................................................... 122	
 A.	 Universities Collect Minimal Data Concerning the Racial 
Impact of their Discipline Systems, and they Keep what they 
Collect Secret ............................................................................... 124	
 B.	 Implicit Bias Infects the Perceptions of Victims, other 
Witnesses, Investigators, and Hearing Examiners and other 
Factfinders ................................................................................... 128	
 C.	 Definitions of Offenses Are Broad and Vague ............................. 131	
 1.	 Sexual Harassment ................................................................ 132	
 2.	 Stalking .................................................................................. 134	
 3.	 Sexual Misconduct, Sexual Assault, and Rape ...................... 137	
 4.	 Litigation Related to Offense Definitions .............................. 139	
 D.	 The Process Is Conducted in Secret ............................................. 141	
 E.	 Procedures Are Informal and Not Uniform ................................. 144	
 F.	 Lawyers for Students Have Limited Roles, and Lawyers Are 
Expensive ..................................................................................... 149	
 G.	 Faculty and Administrators Who Might Normally Speak Up 
for Racial Justice Are Afraid to Undermine Title IX 
Enforcement, or to Appear Soft on Rape ..................................... 152	
 H.	 Investigations of Alleged Sexual Misconduct Are Affected by 
Collective American Attitudes toward Race and Sex ................... 154	
IV.	 SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM ..................................................................... 156	
 A.	 Collect Data, and Make It Public ................................................ 156	
 B.	 Anti-Bias Trainers, Train Thyselves ............................................ 159	
V.	 BROADER IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH .................. 161	
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 164	
 
18 NEV. L.J. 107, TRACHTENBERG - FINAL 12/14/17  5:53 PM 
Fall 2017] UNIVERSITY TITLE IX ENFORCEMENT 109 
INTRODUCTION 
Given the disproportionate suspensions of black students by elementary 
and secondary schools,1 along with what is known about racial bias in the crim-
inal justice system,2 it would be a miracle if university disciplinary procedures 
did not produce outcomes that excessively punish black students, along with 
members of other disadvantaged minority groups. One would expect more uni-
versity charges per capita to be filed against black students than whites, and one 
would expect to find more per capita suspensions of black students.3 But such 
results have not been observed. Not because unexpected justice is located in the 
records of student conduct panels. No, university records do not contain evi-
dence that students of all races face campus discipline at similar rates. Instead, 
one cannot find evidence of disparate impact for the straightforward reason that 
universities do not bother to collect—much less to publish—data that would 
allow such an assessment.4 
For public elementary and secondary schools, rich data exists concerning 
disciplinary outcomes, allowing analysis of how the school discipline process 
has a disparate impact on students of different races.5 The unfairness is so 
stark—black students are suspended about three times as often as white stu-
dents6—that reform advocates refer to the current system as a “school-to-prison 
pipeline.”7 The U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Education 
have instructed public schools of “their obligations under Federal law to admin-
ister student discipline without discriminating on the basis of race, color, or na-
                                                        
1  See infra Section II.A. 
2  See infra Section II.B. 
3  For speculation by other scholars to this effect, see Nancy Gertner, Complicated Process, 
125 YALE L.J. F. 442, 442–43 (2016); Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in 
Title IX Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103, 106–08 (2015). For a contrary argument, 
see Notes: Antuan M. Johnson, Title IX Narratives, Intersectionality, and Male-Biased Con-
ceptions of Racism, 9 GEO. J. L.& MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 57, 59 (2017). For a good over-
view of this issue published while this Article was in the editing process, see Emily Yoffe, 
The Question of Race in Campus Sexual-Assault Cases, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-question-of-race-in-campus-sexu 
al-assault-cases/539361 [https://perma.cc/BPZ4-84XS]. 
4  See infra Section III.A. 
5  See DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE 
IMPACT OF DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 6 (The Ctr. for Civil Rights Remedies at 
The Civil Rights Project at UCLA, 2012); Roger McKinney, Black and Low-Income Stu-
dents More Frequently Suspended from School, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Dec. 28, 2014), 
http://www.columbiatribune.com/e126a57e-da88-5f54-ad51-0e152afd24fc.html [https://per 
ma.cc/24ZH-3PML] (using “data collected by Columbia Public Schools” to evaluate the 
school district). 
6  See LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 5, at 6. 
7  See id. at 4; Russell J. Skiba et al., More than a Metaphor: The Contribution of Exclusion-
ary Discipline to a School-to-Prison Pipeline, 47 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 546, 546 
(2014). 
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tional origin.”8 In short, while no magic bullet is available to solve the problem, 
the problem at least has a name, and efforts are underway in some quarters to 
attack it. Reformers are using education, advocacy, litigation, and legislation in 
various ways.9 
In the criminal justice system—that is, the “real courts,” as opposed to the 
quasi-judicial proceedings of K-12 schools and universities—researchers find 
disparate impact by race in arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and sentencing.10 
This is not news. Criminal law and procedure teachers have told students of this 
for decades, and the evidence is abundant that black Americans are much more 
likely than whites to spend time in prison.11 
Meanwhile, in response to recent pressure from the U.S. Department of 
Education,12 colleges and universities across the country have hurriedly and 
vastly expanded the offices dedicated to investigating and punishing sex dis-
crimination and sexual misconduct on campus.13 At the same time, universities 
are scrambling to become more welcoming to students of all races.14 It seems 
                                                        
8  See, e.g., Joint Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y, Office of Civil Rights, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., & Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Colleague (Jan. 8, 2014) (on file at 
https://www2.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.html [https: 
//perma.cc/SCP8-B8QE]). 
9  See Judith A.M. Scully, Examining and Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Strat-
egies for a Better Future, 68 ARK. L. REV. 959, 990–95 (2016) (discussing strategies). 
10  See, e.g., MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 131 (2d ed. 2006); THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMITTEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 1 (2013); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY xii (1995). 
11  See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Racial Disparities in Prison Getting Worse in the 1990s, 8 
OVERCROWDED TIMES 1 (Feb. 1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of 
Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2004). 
12  See, e.g., Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 204–06 (D. Mass. 2017) (describing 
how one college changed its policies in response to DOE guidance); CATHERINE LHAMON, 
ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014) (documenting various 
letters and other guidance provided by DOE OCR to postsecondary institutions). On Sep-
tember 22, 2017, DOE rescinded the April 29, 2014 “Questions and Answers” guidance 
document. See Dear Colleague Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t Educ. Office for Civil Rights (Sept. 22, 2017). OCR also issued some interim guid-
ance on the same day. See id. 
13  See, Risa L. Lierberwitz et al., The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX, 102 BULL. AM. 
ASS’N U. PROFESSORS 69, 73 (2016); Juliet Eilperin, Biden and Obama Rewrite the Rulebook 
on College Sexual Assaults, WASH. POST (July 3, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-and-obama-rewrite-the-rulebook-on-college 
-sexual-assaults/2016/07/03/0773302e-3654-11e6-a254-2b336e293a3c_story.html?utm_te 
rm=.233c2c5ca670 [https://perma.cc/4JRK-WNVN]. 
14  See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206, 2208 (2016) (discuss-
ing elaborate efforts by university to gain “the educational benefits that flow from diversi-
ty”); LORELLE L. ESPINOSA ET AL., RACE, CLASS, & COLLEGE ACCESS: ACHIEVING DIVERSITY 
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that little attention has been given to the risk that these two efforts might be in 
tension. Might it be possible, even likely, that the hammer wielded by beefed 
up university offices dedicated to prosecuting sex discrimination is falling dis-
proportionately on minority students? Indeed, when one stops to consider the 
question, isn’t it nearly impossible to imagine that Title IX enforcement does 
not have a disparate impact on the basis of race?15 
This Article argues that university discipline procedures likely discriminate 
against minority students and that increasingly muscular Title IX enforce-
ment—launched with the best of intentions in response to real problems—
almost certainly exacerbates yet another systemic barrier to racial justice and 
equal access to educational opportunities. Part I examines evidence from a uni-
versity that has investigated the impact of its discipline system on students of 
different races and has then shared its findings. Part II provides a baseline for 
expectations and analysis by briefly reviewing the well-documented racial bi-
ases in discipline imposed upon elementary and secondary school students as 
well as in the American criminal justice system. Returning to higher education, 
Part III then examines how several features of campus discipline processes, in-
cluding the failure to collect demographic data, enhance the risk of racially dis-
parate impacts. Part IV suggests avenues for reform, including a call for the 
U.S. Department of Education to collect and publish data on the demographics 
of students disciplined by universities. Part V then addresses broader implica-
tions, including the role of “shadow law” in the federal regulation of university 
discipline systems and campus sex, issues of “intersectionality” that arise from 
competing claims for justice related to sex and race, and possible fruitful future 
research. 
Among other things, Part VI briefly discusses whether racial biases affect 
how colleges and universities respond to victims of assault, discrimination, and 
other misconduct. It is possible, for example, that black women are less likely 
than other victims of sexual assault to seek help from university authorities, or 
that universities take their complaints less seriously than those of white women. 
Disparate treatment of complainants (and of those who could be complainants 
but never file reports) is worthy of its own article. This Article, however, fo-
cuses on respondents—that is, those students accused of misconduct—and on 
how campus proceedings likely treat accused students differently depending on 
their race. 
In part, this Article addresses the interaction of two narratives concerning 
modern American higher education. One narrative recounts inadequate reac-
                                                                                                                                 
IN A SHIFTING LEGAL LANDSCAPE 1 (2015); John Eligon, After Racist Episodes, Blunt Dis-
cussions on Campus, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/educ 
ation/edlife/university-of-missouri-struggles-to-bridge-its-racial-divide.html [https://perma. 
cc/65AJ-456B]. 
15  “Title IX” refers to Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681. The statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex at educational programs and 
activities receiving federal funds. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.1. 
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tions by universities to the harassment and rape of students, particularly wom-
en. It also tells of hard-won improvements to the campus environment, as well 
as the unceasing effort of activists for gender equality and the significant work 
that remains unfinished. The other narrative recounts the constant struggle for 
racial equality on campus, beginning in the days of de jure segregation and cel-
ebrating civil rights milestones. It tells too of stubborn impediments to racial 
justice and continued campaigns for change. At least occasionally, these narra-
tives conflict with one another. The tension evokes competing claims for justice 
made during debates in the 1990s about proposed amendments to Federal Rules 
of Evidence related to rape and child molestation cases, which were aimed at 
protecting women and children by increasing the odds that sexual predators 
would be convicted.16 Critics argued that the new rules, which eventually were 
enacted, would harm minority men.17 
This Article examines how certain efforts to win equal access for women to 
higher education may have inadvertently complicated the quest for racial jus-
tice. If my ultimate conclusion gains acceptance—that is, if leaders in higher 
education agree that the threat of racial bias in campus discipline is real and 
demands attention—it will be important not to lose sight of the gender equity 
issues that, after languishing without broad recognition for far too long, have 
recently inspired important campus reforms. 
I. DOCUMENTED INSTANCES OF DISPARATE RACIAL IMPACT AT 
UNIVERSITIES 
At the University of Virginia, the Honor System is serious business.18 The 
university’s handbook for faculty members and teaching assistants refers to the 
Honor System as “the University’s most cherished tradition,” one which “de-
fines the institution and creates the basis for our standard of conduct in the 
community.”19 Known as a “single sanction” regime, Virginia’s system has one 
available punishment: “Students found guilty of an Honor offense are perma-
                                                        
16  See 140 CONG. REC. H23,602 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) 
(“The enactment of this reform is first and foremost a triumph for the public—for the women 
who will not be raped and the children who will not be molested because we have strength-
ened the legal system’s tools for bringing the perpetrators of these atrocious crimes to jus-
tice.”). 
17  See, e.g., Katherine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in 
Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 592 (1997) (“Poor, minority men with an alleged prior 
record will be much more likely to be falsely identified, improperly tried, and wrongfully 
convicted for stranger rapes that they did not commit.”). The provisions are codified at FED. 
R. EVID. 413–415. 
18  See VIRGINIUS DABNEY, MR. JEFFERSON’S UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY 9–10, 196 (1981); Coy 
Barefoot, The Evolution of Honor: Enduring Principle, Changing Times, UVA MAG. (Spring 
2008), http://uvamagazine.org/articles/the_evolution_of_honor/ [https://perma.cc/GF4Q-
NLA4]. 
19  UNIV. OF VA. HONOR SYS., HANDBOOK FOR FACULTY MEMBERS AND TEACHING 
ASSISTANTS (2014) (introductory letter by Rector George Martin). 
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nently dismissed from the University.”20 Although concerns are perennially 
raised about the single sanction regime—perhaps it is too harsh, perhaps it de-
ters the reporting of violations—the system has endured since 1842.21 
For much of the Honor System’s history, the university admitted no black 
students against whom the policy could possibly discriminate.22 Sometime after 
the racial integration of the university, UVA began keeping statistics on the 
demographics of students charged with, and dismissed for, honor offenses.23 
These data indicated that black students were charged and dismissed at vastly 
higher rates than white students.24 In the 1980s, students running the Honor 
System noted that “non-mainstream students had become primary targets for 
honor investigations.”25 The Cavalier Daily reported in 1988 that “statistics for 
the last year show that 29.7 percent of honor accusations are made against 
black students, a number which is disproportionately higher than the approxi-
mately eight percent of blacks attending the University.”26 A study released in 
1996 by the honor committee’s diversity task force contained similar results, 
revealing “that even though black students make up only 12 percent of the stu-
dent body, they accounted for 35 percent of honor investigations and 23 percent 
of students dismissed.”27 A decade later, UVA reacted to statistics telling the 
same story. When the 2008–09 Honor Committee released demographic data 
about its cases, it reported that black students accounted for one-third of all ac-
cused students.28 
The current Honor System faculty handbook reports continued disparities. 
“Over the years, there have been serious concerns that the Honor System dis-
proportionately affects minority students, specifically in the number of reports 
received by the Honor Committee.”29 Once students are reported, students from 
various racial groups are found guilty at similar rates, meaning that the dispar-
ate expulsion of black students is attributable almost entirely to disparate re-
                                                        
20  Id. at 2. In recent years an intermediate sanction (two semesters’ suspension) has been 
made available to students who admit guilt quickly upon being notified of a charge. See id. at 
7. But all students found guilty after a hearing are expelled. See id. at 11. 
21  See Barefoot, supra note 18. 
22  See James Latimer, Negro Wins Suit to Enter Law School at University; State Fails to 
Give Equal Facilities, Judges Point Out, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Sept. 6, 1950). 
23  See Barefoot, supra note 18. 
24  See id. 
25  See id. 
26  See id. (quoting CAVALIER DAILY). 
27  See Nicola White, Lawsuit Raises Questions About Honor, CAVALIER DAILY (Feb. 2, 
2000), http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2000/02/lawsuit-raises-questions-about-honor 
[https://perma.cc/5GXJ-CRT7]. 
28  See Cameron Feller, University Community Reacts to Diversity Statistics from Committee, 
CAVALIER DAILY (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2009/04/university-
community-reacts-to-diversity-statistic [https://perma.cc/PE3G-ANJH] (“I was a little bit 
surprised at the disproportionate number of minority students reported . . .”). 
29  See UNIV. OF VA. HONOR SYS., supra note 19, at 14 (section titled “Diversity and the 
Honor System”). 
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porting rates.30 Two primary explanations present themselves for the pattern of 
disparity observed for decades. Perhaps black students at the University of Vir-
ginia are more likely than their white peers to lie, cheat, and steal. Or, perhaps 
among those students who do commit honor offenses, black students are more 
likely to be reported. The university seems to find the second explanation more 
accurate (as do I), noting the phenomena of “spotlighting” and “dimming.”31 
The faculty handbook explains as follows: 
Spotlighting occurs when those who naturally stand out from those around them 
draw more scrutiny than their peers. Conversely, “dimming” refers to the poten-
tial for some students to avoid notice as they more readily blend in. Asian stu-
dents, international students, and student-athletes in particular have seen a dis-
proportionate number of cases reported against them at various times.32 
A 2001 Cavalier Daily editorial provides further evidence for the “spot-
lighting theory,” drawn from honor charges filed from 2000 to 2001.33 Of all 
students against whom charges were filed that year, “44.2 percent of those stu-
dents were white, although the student body is 71.2 percent white. Black stu-
dents comprise 23.4 percent of those investigated but only 9.5 percent of the 
student body.”34 Most telling is that of the black students accused that year, not 
a single one was convicted.35 Unless the Honor Committee was brazenly dis-
criminating in favor of accused black students, one cannot help but conclude 
that, somehow, black students were over-reported for misconduct. 
Virginia deserves credit for collecting and releasing the data that paint such 
an unflattering picture of the university in the preceding paragraphs. In a sense, 
Virginia has “spotlighted” itself, causing it to “stand out from those around [it 
and] draw more scrutiny than [its] peers.”36 Let us consider now whether Vir-
ginia is probably some sort of bizarre outlier or if, instead, it is more likely that 
data from other institutions—were they only available—would yield similar 
results. Is Virginia a hotbed of racial bias, substantially more so than the bulk 
of American universities? I certainly have no evidence to support such a claim. 
Until other colleges examine the beams in their eyes, they would be wise to 
avoid suggesting that Virginia deserves special criticism for its mote.37 
The University of Virginia surely has its problems with race. It did, after 
all, exclude black students entirely for more than a century,38 and that sort of 
                                                        
30  See id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  See Cavalier Daily Staff, Lead Editorial: Pinpointing Bias, CAVALIER DAILY (Apr. 10, 
2001), http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2001/04/lead-editorial16276 [https://perma.cc/ 
746L-5WPH]. 
34  Id. 
35  See id. 
36  See supra text accompanying note 32. 
37  See Matthew 7:3–5. 
38  See Latimer, supra note 22 (describing decision “which for the first time breached State 
segregation policies surrounding Thomas Jefferson’s 125-year-old citadel of learning”). 
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behavior tends to leave a mark on institutional culture. Then again, universities 
in free states were not beacons of racial equality either during UVA’s segregat-
ed days. Yale College, for example, opened in 1701 and admitted its first black 
student in the 1850s.39 In 1964, it admitted a record number of black freshmen: 
fourteen.40 Would it be unreasonable to speculate that vestiges of Old Yale im-
pede the progress of black Elis today?41 
II. POINTS OF COMPARISON: ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS, SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 
AND REAL COURTS 
To help decide whether racially disparate impact likely pervades university 
discipline nationwide—as opposed to infecting just a few institutions here and 
there—this Part examines contexts beyond higher education in which discipli-
nary records are far easier to obtain. 
The disproportionate exclusion of minority students from the nation’s ele-
mentary and secondary schools has been amply documented. Similarly, the 
tremendous racial inequities wrought by America’s criminal justice system are 
well known. But a very brief review of these systems is nonetheless helpful for 
two reasons. First, it provides context in which observers may evaluate the uni-
versity discipline system, creating the strong presumption that absent some sig-
nificant intervention by university officials, disparate impact on the basis of 
race should be expected. Second, it invites a discussion of certain features of 
university discipline—particularly Title IX enforcement—that not only fail to 
rebut the presumption but instead provide further reason to believe that univer-
sity discipline systems discriminate against minority students. 
A. Racial Injustice in Elementary and Secondary School Discipline 
Disproportionate suspension and expulsion of black students from Ameri-
can elementary and secondary schools have been observed for more than four 
decades.42 As soon as schools began collecting data concerning the de-
mographics of those excluded from schools in the 1970s, educators found racial 
disparities, raising questions of whether the disparate treatment of black stu-
                                                        
39  See Ariel Kaminer, Discovery Leads Yale to Revise a Chapter of Its Black History, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/nyregion/discovery-leads-yale-
to-revise-a-chapter-of-its-black-history.html [https://perma.cc/L2C4-FTKJ]. 
40  See Judith Ann Schiff, Pioneers, YALE ALUMNI MAG. (2006). 
41  Probably not. See Victor Wang, FAS Senate Draft Report Reveals “Lost Decade” for 
Women, Minority Hiring, YALE DAILY NEWS (Apr. 27, 2016), 
https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2016/04/27/fas-senate-report-reveals-lost-decade-for-
women-minority-hiring/ [https://perma.cc/Y4LD-F9QP]. 
42  See Mark G. Yudof, Suspension and Expulsion of Black Students from the Public Schools: 
Academic Capital Punishment and the Constitution, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 374, 374–75 
(1975). This article is so old that Professor Yudof, known more recently for his work as a 
chancellor and president, wrote it years before beginning his career as a university adminis-
trator. 
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dents violated constitutional guarantees or other anti-discrimination law.43 They 
still find disparities today.44 And in jurisdictions allowing schools to impose 
corporal punishment,45 scholars have documented racial bias in its use,46 mean-
ing that minority students suffer literal “disparate impact.”47 
Closer inspection of school discipline records reveals an important pattern: 
Schools produce greater disparities among students of different races when they 
punish ambiguously-defined misconduct—such as “disrespect” and “excessive 
noise”—than when they punish more clearly-defined wrongdoing like smok-
ing.48 While black students are far more likely than white students to be sanc-
tioned for “disrespect,” the punishment rates for vandalism are similar.49 (The 
greater subjectivity involved in findings of “disrespect” is shown by the need 
for quotation marks around the name of the offense to signal a term of art.) One 
can imagine debatable cases of possible school property vandalism, but the 
concept is straightforward. “Disrespect,” by contrast, truly does depend on the 
perspective of the beholder. For whatever reason, even though black students 
and white students are caught smoking and defacing property at similar rates, 
school teachers and principals deem black students to be substantially more 
“disrespectful.”50 
The perception of black students as more culpable—and thus deserving 
greater school discipline—accords with psychological research showing that 
black boys are viewed as older and less innocent than whites.51 (Relatedly, 
                                                        
43  See id. at 381. 
44  See Rachel M. Cohen, Rethinking School Discipline, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 2, 2016), 
http://prospect.org/article/rethinking-school-discipline [https://perma.cc/74U3-7U9X] (re-
porting that “expulsions and suspensions . . . are doled out disproportionately to minority 
students”); Scully, supra note 9, at 972–73 (“Data from the Department of Education indi-
cates that while Black children comprise sixteen percent of public school enrollment, they 
constitute between thirty-two and forty-two percent of out-of-school suspensions or expul-
sions.”). 
45  See Valerie Strauss, 19 States Still Allow Corporal Punishment in School, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/09/18/19-
states-still-allow-corporal-punishment-in-school/ [https://perma.cc/JVH2-VV9T]. 
46  See Stephen S. Owen, The Relationship Between Social Capital and Corporal Punishment 
in Schools: A Theoretical Inquiry, 37 YOUTH & SOC’Y 85, 88–89 (2005) (collecting studies). 
47  It is difficult to decide which is worse, the racial discrimination or the underlying fact that 
some students suffer corporal punishment at the hands of public school teachers. In any 
event, for black students, the injury of corporal punishment adds to the insult of knowing 
that racial bias may well have contributed to their suffering. 
48  See Russell J. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Dis-
proportionality in School Punishment, 34 URB. REV. 317, 317, 332 (2002) (finding that racial 
disparities are greater for offenses more “subjective in interpretation,” as opposed to more 
concrete violations like “smoking” and “vandalism”). 
49  See id. 
50  See id. at 332, 334. 
51  See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing 
Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 526 (2014) (“Black boys are 
seen as older and less innocent and that they prompt a less essential conception of childhood 
than do their White same-age peers.”). 
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black juveniles are far more likely to be tried in the adult court system, where 
they receive harsher sentences than white juvenile offenders.52) For black girls, 
perceptions that they are “loud, defiant, and precocious” contribute to their dis-
proportionate punishment.53 Excessive punishment falls particularly harshly on 
darker-skinned black girls.54 
Critics have a name for the collection of school policies that punish black 
children at disproportionate rates and introduce them into the criminal justice 
system: the “school-to-prison pipeline.”55 As one scholar put it, “The school-to-
prison pipeline is a devastating process through which many of our children—
particularly males and students of color—receive an inadequate education and 
are then pushed out of public schools and into the criminal punishment sys-
tem.”56 Because the problem is so serious, it is on the agenda of groups such as 
the American Civil Liberties Union, the Children’s Defense Fund, the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Southern Poverty Law Center.57 
The U.S. Department of Education, along with the U.S. Department of Justice, 
has issued guidance to schools on how to reduce racial discrimination in their 
disciplinary policies and practices.58 
Disparate treatment of black students is by no means limited to high school 
students and others who might plausibly fit the profile of a juvenile delinquent. 
The Department of Education has observed that excessive punishment of black 
students begins in preschool.59 According to the Civil Rights Data Collection, 
                                                        
52  See, e.g., PAOLO G. ANNINO ET AL., JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NON-HOMICIDE 
OFFENSES: FLORIDA COMPARED TO NATION (2009); Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Aneeta Rattan, 
The Race Factor in Trying Juveniles as Adults, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/05/when-to-punish-a-young-offender-and-
when-to-rehabilitate/the-race-factor-in-trying-juveniles-as-adults [https://perma.cc/MT2C-
XKBL]. 
53  See MONIQUE W. MORRIS, PUSHOUT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK GIRLS IN SCHOOLS 
11, 13 (2016); Edward W. Morris, “Ladies” or “Loudies”? Perceptions and Experiences of 
Black Girls in Classrooms, 38 YOUTH & SOC. 490, 490 (2007). 
54  See Lance Hannon et al., The Relationship Between Skin Tone and School Suspension for 
African Americans, 5 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 281, 281 (2013) (finding that while dark skin cor-
relates with greater punishment, the results were “disproportionately driven by the experi-
ences of African American females”). For evidence of the same phenomenon in criminal 
courtrooms, see Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicali-
ty of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383 
(2006). 
55  See generally Skiba et al., supra note 7; Scully, supra note 9, at 960. 
56  Scully, supra note 9, at 959. 
57  See id. at 959 n.1. 
58  See U.S. Departments of Education and Justice Release School Discipline Guidance 
Package to Enhance School Climate and Improve School Discipline Policies/Practices, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-departments-
education-and-justice-release-school-discipline-guidance-package-enhance-school-climate-
and-improve-school-discipline-policiespractices [https://perma.cc/28WE-2YRU]. 
59  U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, DATA 
SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 1, 1 (2014), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf [https://perma. 
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“Black children represent 18% of preschool enrollment, but 48% of preschool 
children receiving more than one out-of-school suspension; in comparison, 
white students represent 43% of preschool enrollment but 26% of preschool 
children receiving more than one out of school suspension.”60 These findings 
accord with research showing that when preschool teachers are told to look out 
for bad behavior, they tend to focus attention on black boys.61 
The pattern continues for all of K-12 education.62 Overall, “Black students 
are suspended and expelled at a rate three times greater than white students.63 
On average, 5% of white students are suspended, compared to 16% of black 
students.”64 Further, just as “school-to-prison pipeline” critics describe, schools 
refer black students to the criminal justice system at disproportionate rates.65 
“While black students represent 16% of student enrollment, they represent 27% 
of students referred to law enforcement and 31% of students subjected to a 
school-related arrest. In comparison, white students represent 51% of enroll-
ment, 41% of students referred to law enforcement, and 39% of those arrest-
ed.”66 Observers have found disparate racial impact in the public school disci-
pline of all fifty states.67 
While one can debate the cause, the results are stark. For whatever reason, 
American schools punish black students far more than they punish white stu-
dents. Whether in preschool, high school, or anything in between, black stu-
dents more commonly receive suspensions and expulsions, and a higher per-
centage of black students are delivered by schools to police. Once the police 
become involved, students experience all of the racial bias observed in the 
criminal justice system. 
B. Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System 
On December 31, 2015, the United States held 1,476,847 sentenced prison-
ers under the jurisdiction of state or federal correctional authorities.68 About 
523,000 of them, 35.4 percent of the total, were black.69 Of the entire United 
                                                                                                                                 
cc/LB26-ZNYU] (using 2011-2012 data). 
60  Id. 
61  See Walter S. Gilliam et al., Do Early Educators’ Implicit Biases Regarding Sex and Race 
Relate to Behavior Expectations and Recommendations of Preschool Expulsions and Sus-
pensions? YALE CHILD STUDY CTR. 2 (2016) (“Findings revealed that when expecting chal-
lenging behaviors teachers gazed longer at Black children, especially Black boys.”). 
62  U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 1. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  See Scully, supra note 9, at 960, 960 n.3. 
68  E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, U.S. DEP’T JUST., BUREAU JUST. STAT., NCJ 
250229, PRISONERS IN 2015 6 (2016). 
69  Id. This figure “excludes persons of Hispanic or Latino origin and persons of two or more 
races.” 
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States population in 2015, about 13.3 percent was black.70 One could reproduce 
similar statistics for persons held in local jails and on probation, and one could 
disaggregate the data by state. Regardless of how one slices it, however, the re-
sult would not change much. Black Americans are overwhelmingly more likely 
than whites to find themselves under the control of the penal system.71 Al-
though the causes are complicated and the subject of much debate,72 the raw 
numbers tell a story one cannot deny. 
Racial disparities pervade the criminal justice system from investigation to 
incarceration. At the earliest stages of what might become a criminal case, 
when police decide what and whom to investigate, race affects the likelihood 
that police will seize a person going about his daily business and subject him to 
a search.73 The stop-and-frisk program in New York City, found unconstitu-
tional in federal court,74 is perhaps the most prominent example of a nationwide 
phenomenon. Blacks fare no better in vehicles than on foot. The Missouri At-
torney General, for example, found that although police had a higher “contra-
band hit rate” when pulling over white motorists, black motorists were far more 
likely to be stopped and to have their vehicles searched.75 Whether in or out of 
cars, black suspects are also arrested at higher rates than whites.76 Racial dis-
                                                        
70  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, “QUICK FACTS,” https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/ 
PST045216 [https://perma.cc/7SLC-PT52] (also measuring black Americans reporting “only 
one race”). 
71  See generally MAUER, supra note 10, at 1; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 10. 
72  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 114–15 (2012); CHRIS HAYES, A COLONY IN A NATION 113–14 (2017); 
JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is the major engine of 
mass incarceration). 
73  See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means 
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660–61 (1994); The Editorial Board, Racial Discrim-
ination in Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/ 
13/opinion/racial-discrimination-in-stop-and-frisk.html [https://perma.cc/3PV3-GFH4] (re-
counting federal court findings about stop-and-frisk in New York City). 
74  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 664–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
75  See, e.g., OFFICE OF MO. ATT’Y GEN., VEHICLE STOPS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2015), 
https://www.ago.mo.gov/home/vehicle-stops-report/2015-executive-summary 
[https://perma.cc/XL24-BTJK]. White “contraband hit rate” was 29.57 percent, and black 
“contraband hit rate” was 24.44 percent. While accounting for 10.9 percent of the state popu-
lation, blacks constituted 17.5 percent of motorists stopped by police. 
76  See Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of 
Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 419 (2005); Paula J. Fite et al., Explaining 
Discrepancies in Arrest Rates Between Black and White Male Juveniles, 77 J. CONSULTING 
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 916, 916 (2009) (“When examining arrest rates, one finds racial dis-
crepancies that cannot be ignored.”); Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: ‘Stagger-
ing Disparity’, USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2014, 5:13 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/new 
s/nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest-rates/19043207 [https://perma.cc/SF5V-VKUN] 
(noting that racial disparity in arrest rates observed in Ferguson, Missouri was exceeded by 
at least “1,581 other police departments across the USA”). 
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parities in arrest rates are observed both for juveniles and adults.77 And police 
officers use force against black suspects at much higher rates than against white 
suspects.78 Police officers, along with witnesses who provide information to po-
lice, appear to systemically find black Americans more suspicious than whites, 
and thereby subject blacks to more intense investigation and policing than 
whites.79 
Upon conviction, black defendants receive harsher sentences than those 
imposed on whites.80 Although this phenomenon has multiple causes and has 
inspired much debate,81 it is nearly impossible to argue that the entire disparity 
is attributable to differential offense rates and the severity of offenses commit-
ted.82 That is, the harsher sentences cannot be explained as a straightforward 
consequence of worse behavior. Instead, sentencing judges, along with the pro-
bation officials who prepare pre-sentence reports, appear to systemically find 
black convicts to be more dangerous (or culpable) than whites,83 and, accord-
ingly, deserving of greater punishment.84 
                                                        
77  Fite et al., supra note 76, at 916; David Huizinga et al., Disproportionate Minority Con-
tact in the Juvenile Justice System: A Study of Differential Minority Arrest/Referral to Court 
in Three Cities i (July 28, 2007) (unpublished report, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention). 
78  See PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY, THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE: 
RACE, ARRESTS, AND POLICE USE OF FORCE 4 (2016) (“[R]acial disparities in police use of 
force persist even when controlling for racial distribution of local arrest rates”). 
79  Note that no individual officer need be deemed “a racist” for this observation to hold, and 
I make no accusations about anyone’s intent. Indeed, no analysis whatsoever of police of-
ficer character is needed. One simply observes that for whatever reason, blacks are stopped, 
searched, and arrested at higher rates than can be explained by their behavior alone. 
80  See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 10, at 12; George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Ra-
cial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as 
Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 554 (1998). 
81  One study found that convicts with a more “stereotypically Black features” are more like-
ly to receive death sentences. See EBERHARDT supra note 54, at 383–84; see also Rebecca C. 
Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial Disparities in Incarceration Increase Acceptance of 
Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1949, 1949 (2014). 
82  See, e.g., Eric P. Baumer, Reassessing and Redirecting Research on Race and Sentencing, 
30 JUST. Q. 231, 236–37 (2013); ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF 
JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3, 9 (2016). 
83  This result accords with psychological research finding that people see black men as larg-
er and more threatening than white men of the same size. See John Paul Wilson et al., Racial 
Bias in Judgments of Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat, 113 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 59, 59 (2017). 
84  Again, no analysis of the character of judges or probation officers is needed to support 
this finding, and I make no claim about anyone’s heart. The focus is on what institutional 
actors do, not the sort of persons they are. See Jay Smooth, How to Tell Someone They Sound 
Racist, YOUTUBE, (July 21, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0Ti-gkJiXc 
[https://perma.cc/7473-ECNY] (discussing difference between a “what[-]they[-]did conver-
sation” and a “what[-]they[-]are conversation,” saying, “When somebody picks my pocket, 
I’m not going to be chasing him down so I can figure out whether he feels like he’s a thief 
deep down in his heart”). 
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In sum, members of racial minorities are more likely than whites to be 
stopped and frisked by police and are more likely to be pulled over while driv-
ing, despite being less likely to possess contraband when searched. Minorities 
are more likely than whites to be arrested for the same conduct and face more 
serious charges when prosecuted. And if convicted, minorities receive tougher 
sentences. At least some of the factors contributing to racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system—such as implicit bias among witnesses and investiga-
tors—exist on campus too. 
C. Common Themes to Examine at the University Level 
In both K–12 school discipline and in real courts, black Americans receive 
greater punishment than do whites committing the same conduct. This pattern 
persists in rural, suburban, and urban communities, and no state or region is 
immune.85 Diligent efforts by scholars, activists, and government officials may 
have ameliorated the problem but have not eliminated it. Accordingly, absent 
compelling evidence that university discipline procedures have somehow evad-
ed the pitfalls that pervade the criminal justice system and elementary and sec-
ondary school discipline, one should presume that universities impose disci-
pline more harshly on their black students than on their white students. 
Predicting otherwise demonstrates either naiveté or willful blindness. 
When examining the policies and procedures used in university discipline, 
observers should pay particular attention to the dangers of implicit bias.86 The 
implicit bias exhibited by police officers draws disproportionate numbers of 
black Americans into the criminal justice system, setting in motion a process 
that results in vastly greater incarceration rates for them. Similarly, the implicit 
bias exhibited by elementary and secondary school teachers and administrators 
causes disproportionate numbers of black students to be suspended for conduct 
described as “disrespect,” thereby placing far more black students into the 
school-to-prison pipeline. Even if university officials do not intend to punish 
black students more harshly, implicit bias may well cause similar harm on 
campus. Further, the more that university officials concern themselves with 
conduct about which reasonable persons could disagree (e.g., whether certain 
text messages constitute harassment, or whether following someone after class 
to ask for a date constituted stalking) as opposed to less debatable offenses 
(e.g., vandalism, theft, possession of alcohol in dormitories, invasion of privacy 
with hidden cameras), the more that implicit bias among witnesses and univer-
sity officials can yield racially disparate impact. 
In addition, because of the strong correlation between race and socioeco-
nomic status, observers should note any aspects of the university discipline 
process that favor students with greater economic and social capital. In the 
                                                        
85  See CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 29, appx. tbl. 3; Scully, supra note 9, at 960 
n.3; see also supra Section II.A and II.B. 
86  For further explanation of implicit bias, see infra Section III.B. 
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criminal justice system, access to private lawyers (that is, access to sufficient 
money to pay for private lawyers) provides criminal defendants with large ad-
vantages over defendants reliant on indigent defense provided by the state.87 If 
university processes provide opportunities for wealthier students to purchase 
better results—or, to be less crass, to use money to increase their odds of a fa-
vorable outcome—then white students will disproportionately avail themselves 
of these options. Relatedly, in the elementary and secondary school context, 
parents with lower social capital are more likely to have their children excluded 
from school.88 If factors like social connections and parental education levels 
correlate positively with “good” outcomes (from the perspective of students ac-
cused of misconduct),89 then white students more likely to possess such social 
capital will disproportionately avoid university discipline. 
III.  HOW THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF UNIVERSITY TITLE IX 
ENFORCEMENT ENHANCES RISKS OF DISPARATE IMPACT ON THE BASIS OF 
RACE 
Commentators from across the political spectrum have assailed the meth-
ods by which universities investigate and punish sexual misconduct and har-
assment.90 Critics have highlighted the procedural changes forced upon univer-
sities by the Department of Education (DOE) Office for Civil Rights, arguing 
                                                        
87  See generally Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effective-
ness: Self-Selection by the “Marginally Indigent,” 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 249 (2005); 
Jaeah Lee et al., Charts: Why You’re in Deep Trouble If You Can’t Afford a Lawyer, 
MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/public-
defenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts/# [https://perma.cc/545C-HTGR]. 
88  See Ann Meier, Social Capital and School Achievement Among Adolescents 29 (Ctr. for 
Demography & Ecology, Univ. of Wis.-Madison, Working Paper No. 99-18, 1999) (“[T]he 
probability of being suspended from school decreases with family income and parental edu-
cation.”); JOANNA TAYLOR ET AL., LAW. COMM. FOR CIV. RIGHTS ECON. JUST., NOT 
MEASURING UP: THE STATE OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN MASSACHUSETTS 1 (2014); see also 
Aaron Kupchik & Thomas J. Mowen, Hurting Families, in THE REAL SCHOOL SAFETY 
PROBLEM: THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF HARSH SCHOOL PUNISHMENT 56–72 (2016) 
(illustrating consequences on parents of excluded students). 
89  These factors certainly correlate strongly with other good outcomes in the university set-
ting, such as admission to selective programs. See, e.g., Evan J. Mandery, End College Leg-
acy Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, (April 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/opin 
ion/end-college-legacy-preferences.html [https://perma.cc/C3A7-933L] (“A Princeton team 
found the advantage to be worth the equivalent of 160 additional points on an applicant’s 
SAT, nearly as much as being a star athlete. . . .”); T. Rees Shapiro, At U-Va., a ‘Watch List’ 
Flags VIP Applicants for Special Handling, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.washin 
gtonpost.com/local/education/at-u-va-a-watch-list-flags-vip-applicants-for-special-handling/ 
2017/04/01/9482b256-106e-11e7-9d5a-a83e627dc120_story.html?utm_term=.c1b52dff640a 
[https://perma.cc/ZVZ8-3QQZ]. 
90  See, e.g., LAURA KIPNIS, UNWANTED ADVANCES: SEXUAL PARANOIA COMES TO CAMPUS 
(2017) (“If this is feminism, it’s feminism hijacked by melodrama.”); KC JOHNSON & 
STUART TAYLOR JR., THE CAMPUS RAPE FRENZY: THE ATTACK ON DUE PROCESS AT 
AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES vii (2017) (book by authors previously known for attacks on af-
firmative action and political correctness). 
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that university rules deny “respondents”—as the accused are generally 
known—adequate discovery, access to counsel, and impartial finders of facts.91 
Others have noted shortcomings not directly attributable to DOE guidance, re-
porting defects that universities have adopted without federal prompting.92 In 
response, supporters of invigorated federal anti-discrimination efforts have ar-
gued that the Department is simply doing its job and promoting equal access to 
educational opportunity.93 I will largely sidestep the larger debate on whether 
universities have gone astray in response to a combination of federal pressure 
and genuine desire to combat sexual assault and harassment. 
Instead of litigating the general pros and cons of modern Title IX enforce-
ment, this Part focuses on certain attributes of the university discipline appa-
ratus (including, but not limited to, resolution of sexual harassment and mis-
conduct complaints) that increase the risk of racially disparate impact. Among 
others, the following aspects of university discipline should worry supporters of 
racial equality: (1) universities collect minimal data concerning the racial im-
pact of their discipline systems, and they keep what they collect secret; (2) im-
plicit bias infects the perceptions of victims, other witnesses, investigators, and 
hearing examiners and other factfinders; (3) definitions of offenses are broad 
and vague; (4) the process is conducted in secret; (5) procedures are informal 
and not uniform; (6) counsel for students have limited roles, and access to 
counsel is expensive; (7) faculty and administrators who might normally speak 
up for racial justice are afraid to undermine Title IX enforcement; and (8) in-
vestigations of alleged sexual misconduct are affected by collective American 
attitudes toward race and interracial sex. Each of these items is addressed be-
low. 
 
                                                        
91  See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-
harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y3AJ-UE4W] (letter from 28 Harvard Law School faculty arguing that 
“[W]e find the new sexual harassment policy inconsistent with many of the most basic prin-
ciples we teach.”); Jodie Jackson Jr., Curators Approve New Title IX Policies; Faculty Push 
for Legal Representation, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (last updated Feb. 6, 2015, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.columbiatribune.com/f9584490-4ac7-58d2-b260-bcd3700f8968.html 
[https://perma.cc/WK5Z-JCC6] (“The changes were adopted despite a letter, signed by some 
200 faculty members, pushing to amend the new rules”). 
92  See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, What Went Wrong with Title IX?, WASH. MONTHLY 
(Sept./Oct. 2015), http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/septoct-2015/what-went-wrong-
with-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/RRT6-9UYT] (“[N]othing in Title IX—nor, crucially, in the 
Department of Education’s recent pronouncements about that statute—required Harvard, 
Northwestern, or LSU to take the actions that have drawn such criticism”). 
93  See Tyler Kingkade, Stop Attacking the Education Department for Enforcing Title IX, 80 
Advocacy Groups Say, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/education-department-title-ix_us_57869f24e4b08608d332c880 [https://perma.cc/V5V 
5-HEW4] (“ ‘Unfortunately, the Department is facing unwarranted criticism for doing its 
job’ ”). 
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A. Universities Collect Minimal Data Concerning the Racial Impact of their 
Discipline Systems, and they Keep what they Collect Secret 
Unlike in real courts, where a diligent researcher could compare indict-
ments and trial transcripts with subsequent sentences imposed by judges, stu-
dent disciplinary records are not available for public inspection. They are pro-
tected as “education records” under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA).94 This protection may be quite sensible but nonetheless prevents 
accused students from evaluating possible comparator cases to see if they have 
been treated fairly.95 
Beyond hindering the defense teams of accused students, the sealing of 
student discipline records under FERPA prevents researchers from inde-
pendently examining whether any particular university—or universities in gen-
eral—discipline students of different races at different rates. Unless a university 
prepares redacted versions of disciplinary records for the convenience of schol-
ars and law reformers, one must take the school’s word on possible racially 
disparate impact. Further, unless the university compiles its own statistics—
calculating, for example, what percentage of suspended students is of which 
race and how that compares to the broader student body—there is no institu-
tional “word” to take. 
In contrast to elementary and secondary schools, which report information 
about their discipline cases to the Civil Rights Data Collection operated by the 
U.S. Department of Education,96 universities are not required to submit such 
data to the federal government. 
The unavailability of demographic data concerning disciplined students—
as well as how the missing data prevents outsiders from determining whether 
universities engage in racial discrimination—is illustrated by recent lawsuits 
against Amherst College and the University of Pennsylvania.97 John Doe, an 
Asian-American student expelled by Amherst after being found guilty at a col-
lege hearing of rape, alleged that “only male students of color have been pun-
ished with separation from the College in connection with sexual misconduct 
allegations” since the adoption of new rules designed to accord with DOE 
guidance.98 However, despite the perception on campus of past racial dispari-
                                                        
94  See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(4)(A) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 99 (2017). 
95  See infra Section III.D (on proceedings conducted in secret). 
96  For background on the CRDC, see CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION (CRDC), U.S. DEP’T. 
OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/data.html [https://perma.cc/8WDC-
2YL4] (last updated Nov. 30, 2016). 
97  See Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 218–19 (D. Mass. 2017); Doe v. Trs. of 
the Univ. of Pa., No. 2:16-CV-05088-JP, at 26 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2016). In each of these 
cases, “John Doe” is a pseudonym. Amherst, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 202. Many plaintiffs alleg-
ing wrongful university discipline procedures proceed as “John Does.” See, e.g., Doe v. Al-
ger, 317 F.R.D. 37, 42 (W.D. Va. 2016) (concluding “that Doe’s privacy interest outweighs 
the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings and that he may thus proceed anony-
mously”). 
98  Amherst, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 224. 
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ties, the plaintiff could not support his claim because he lacked proof “that oth-
er male students have been accused of similar conduct and received less severe 
punishments.”99 As a result, although the trial judge denied a motion to dismiss 
Doe’s claims of breach of contract related to (1) being found guilty despite in-
sufficient evidence, (2) being denied a fair hearing procedure, and (3) gender 
discrimination, the court dismissed his racial discrimination claim.100 
Amherst’s lack of data is especially frustrating because the college pub-
lished a report in 2013 noting a belief on campus that the college treats accused 
students differently based on their race.101 The document, entitled “Toward a 
Culture of Respect: The Problem of Sexual Misconduct at Amherst College,” 
reported, “Many students of color, both male and female, and some internation-
al students, believe that the College takes a more punitive attitude toward non-
white perpetrators, especially if the victim is white.”102 Whatever actions Am-
herst undertook to combat the perception (and perhaps the reality) of racially-
linked unfairness, it did not include the collection and publication of data by 
which Doe could evaluate the treatment of students of different races by the 
college’s disciplinary apparatus.103 Despite this handicap, Doe had no problem 
convincing the trial court that some of his claims might have merit. For exam-
ple, the sexual act at issue in Doe’s case occurred while both Doe and the com-
plainant, “Sandra Jones” were intoxicated, and Jones was “far less intoxicated 
than Doe.”104 Because the college pursued charges only against Doe—and did 
not suggest that Jones committed misconduct by engaging in sexual activity 
with Doe, who “has consistently claimed he was ‘blacked out’ and retains no 
memory of the night”—Doe claimed that he suffered gender-based discrimina-
tion.105 The trial judge found that Doe stated a claim with respect to gender dis-
crimination by articulating disparate treatment; he was charged, and she was 
not.106 To bring a race-discrimination claim, however, Doe would have needed 
information about other accused students (ideally, white students accused of 
conduct similar to his yet not expelled), to which he had no access. 
As this article was in the editing process, another John Doe—this one an 
African-American student—had his racial discrimination claim dismissed for 
                                                        
99  See id. at 219. This data is also unavailable to victims, preventing them from evaluating 
whether colleges take complaints by certain victims more seriously than those by others. 
100  Id. at 203–04. Amherst eventually reached a confidential settlement with Doe. See Set-
tlement Order of Dismissal, Civil Action No. 15-30097-MGM (Aug. 2, 2017). 
101  See SPECIAL OVERSIGHT COMM. ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, AMHERST C., TOWARD A 
CULTURE OF RESPECT: THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AT AMHERST COLLEGE 21 
(2013). 
102  Id. 
103  The report itself noted the unavailability of useful data. See id. (“It is impossible at this 
remove to know if this has ever been true, and the records that would tell us are closed or 
have been destroyed.”). 
104  See Amherst, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 208. 
105  See id. at 208, 218. 
106  See id. at 224. 
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want of “facts that give rise to an inference of racial bias or discrimination.”107 
Doe was initially expelled from the University of Pennsylvania (“Penn”) for 
violating the university’s sexual violence policy during a sexual encounter with 
another student.108 He argued that the sex was consensual and appealed the ex-
pulsion decision within the university, which reduced his punishment to a two-
year suspension.109 He then sued, alleging breach of contract, gender discrimi-
nation (in violation of Title IX), racial discrimination (in violation of Title VI), 
and other legal wrongs.110 As in the Amherst case, the judge deciding the Penn 
case held that while the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence of gender dis-
crimination to survive a motion to dismiss—and thereby to reach discovery—
his racial discrimination claim failed.111 The evidence supporting the gender 
discrimination claim was somewhat thin. The plaintiff lacked “an allegation of 
any arguably inculpatory statements by a representative of the University” and 
offered only “allegations regarding training materials and possible pro-
complainant bias on the part of University officials,” which the judge found 
“set forth sufficient circumstances suggesting inherent and impermissible gen-
der bias to support a plausible claim that Defendant violated Title IX under an 
erroneous outcome theory.”112 
To justify his racial discrimination claim, the Penn plaintiff stated that 
“ ‘the respondents in [the] comparable matters . . . were not African Ameri-
can[s]’ and ‘the sanctions recommended and imposed at each stage of the dis-
ciplinary process were more severe because of [Plaintiff’s] race and gen-
der.’ ”113 Lacking either statistical evidence or anecdotes about specific white 
respondents receiving more lenient treatment, however, Doe’s allegations were 
based “upon information and belief.”114 The judge found that plaintiff’s “con-
clusory allegation that Plaintiff was treated differently in the disciplinary pro-
ceedings due to his race” was insufficient to state a claim.115 Again, a universi-
ty’s opacity with respect to its disciplinary process had spared administrators 
from discovery related to possible racial bias. 
                                                        
107  See Doe v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., No. 16-5088, 2017 WL 4049033, at *14, *21–22 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2017) (finding that the complaint “relies exclusively on conclusory alle-
gations that Plaintiff was treated unfairly because of his race”). 
108  See id. at *1–*3. 
109  See id. at *2–*3. 
110  See id. at *4. 
111  See id. at *15–*18, *21–*22. 
112  See id. at *16. 
113  See id. at *21. 
114  See id. For an example of the sort of statistical data that would have been useful to Doe, 
see Yoffe, supra note 3 (discussing OCR investigation into possible Title VI violations by 
Colgate University). “In the 2013–14 academic year, 4.2 percent of Colgate’s students were 
black. According to the university’s records, in that year black male students were accused 
of 50 percent of the sexual violations reported to the university, and they made up 40 percent 
of the students formally adjudicated.” 
115  Doe v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 2017 WL 4049033, at *22. 
18 NEV. L.J. 107, TRACHTENBERG - FINAL 12/14/17  5:53 PM 
Fall 2017] UNIVERSITY TITLE IX ENFORCEMENT 127 
The inability of Doe and Doe to support their claims about racially dispar-
ate impact at Amherst and Penn will not surprise anyone who has tried to col-
lect similar information from other colleges. With the help of a law student re-
search assistant, I contacted the Title IX offices of several universities, asking if 
they keep publicly-available data identifying the race of complainants and re-
spondents in Title IX cases, as well as in student discipline cases more general-
ly.116 The near-universal answer was no.117 Most institutions indicated that they 
keep no such data at all.118 A few said that they have the data but will not share 
it.119 
One can understand why universities might not wish to collect and publish 
data concerning the demographics of students subjected to institutional disci-
pline. Such data could prove embarrassing, and in the case of plaintiffs like Mr. 
Doe, it could help lawyers build cases against the universities keeping the data. 
To understand such a desire is not, however, to justify it. All sorts of institu-
tions are required to maintain publicly-available data capable of causing institu-
tional embarrassment and providing grist for the mill of the plaintiff’s bar. For 
example, hospitals keep records of patient outcomes despite knowing that if da-
ta indicate an unusually high complication rate, patients may take future busi-
ness elsewhere.120 As described above, elementary and secondary schools re-
port discipline demographics to the DOE.121 The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration requires many employers to keep records of serious 
work-related accidents and illnesses,122 creating reports that personal injury 
lawyers may find valuable reading.123 The Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) maintains the Adverse Event Reporting System, a database that tracks 
adverse event and medication error reports to support the FDA’s post-
marketing safety surveillance program for drug and therapeutic biologic prod-
                                                        
116  Responses (hereinafter, “University Responses”) are on file with author. 
117  See id. 
118  See id. 
119  See id. For public universities taking such a stance, the data may be available under state 
open records laws, sometimes known as “sunshine laws.” For private universities, the data 
are likely unavailable outside of the litigation discovery process. 
120  Nir Menachemi & Taleah H. Collum, Benefits and Drawbacks of Electronic Health Rec-
ord Systems, 4 RISK MGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL’Y 47, 47 (2011) (discussing impact of 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009, 
which encouraged widespread use of electronic health records). 
121  See generally, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION (CRDC), U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., supra 
note 96. 
122  See 29 C.F.R. 1904.0 (2017). 
123  James B. Insco II, Five Issues Employers Should Consider with OSHA’s New Workplace 
Injuries and Illnesses Reporting Rule, K&L GATES (June 21, 2016) 
http://www.klgates.com/five-issues-employers-should-consider-with-oshas-new-workplace-
injuries-and-illnesses-reporting-rule-06-21-2016/ [https://perma.cc/TY7P-AGYB] (worrying 
that new publication rule will put information “on the internet for any curious onlooker, 
competitor, or personal injury lawyer”). 
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ucts,124 which tort lawyers happen to find useful.125 The National Transporta-
tion Safety Board keeps records of aviation “accidents and incidents,”126 which 
might assist in proving that a certain pilot is incompetent. 
Universities committed to racial equality—which pretty much every uni-
versity today purports to be—should immediately begin collecting and publish-
ing demographic data that would allow outside observers to evaluate whether 
the university discipline process has a disparate impact on the basis of race.127 
If underlying records have not been destroyed, universities should also review 
prior cases to assemble statistical data for the past several years, thereby 
providing a baseline for measuring future results. Regardless of whether uni-
versities begin collecting data on their own, the U.S. Department of Education 
should require the submission of such data by universities receiving federal 
funds, thereby assuring near-universal compliance and uniform collection and 
reporting methods.128 
B. Implicit Bias Infects the Perceptions of Victims, other Witnesses, 
Investigators, and Hearing Examiners and other Factfinders 
“Implicit bias” is the talk of higher education, with professors scrambling 
to study it and administrators racing to implement programs intended to reduce 
its pernicious effects. A wealth of research convincingly demonstrates that even 
well-meaning persons with no desire to exhibit racial animus nonetheless act 
under the influence of unconscious biases that systemically affect others on the 
basis of race.129 These biases affect access to higher education. In one study, 
professors receiving unsolicited requests for advice were much more likely to 
                                                        
124  Questions and Answers on FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/Adver
seDrugEffects/default.htm [https://perma.cc/9H3S-98SV] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017) (not-
ing that FDA uses data to create “quarterly reports on potential serious side effects identified 
by FAERS”). 
125  See In re Accutane Litig., Civ. Action No.: 271(MCL), 2015 WL 753674, at 23 (N.J. Su-
per. Law Div. Feb. 20, 2015) (discussing plaintiff’s counsel’s use of FAERS data). 
126  See generally, Aviation Accident Database & Synopses, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, 
https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/BX7K-WBCM] 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2017). The Federal Aviation Administration keeps an additional data-
base, the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system, that includes 
incidents not investigated by the NTSB. See http://www.asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:1 
[https://perma.cc/FG6Q-2L7D] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
127  For further discussion of the sort of data that would be useful, see infra Section IV.A. 
128  For more on what the DOE can require, as well as the laws granting DOE authority to do 
so, see infra Section IV.A. at 42–43. 
129  See, e.g., MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES 
OF GOOD PEOPLE xii (2016); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Damian 
A. Stanley et al., Implicit Race Attitudes Predict Trustworthiness Judgments and Economic 
Trust Decisions, 108 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 7710, 7710 (2011); Damian 
Stanley et al., The Neural Basis of Implicit Attitudes, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 
164, 164 (2008). 
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respond to messages from white students than from students of other races.130 
This basic finding, while frustrating, was, perhaps, not surprising. The re-
searchers also reported two “counterintuitive” findings: First, “representation 
does not reduce bias,” meaning that adding women and minorities to the faculty 
did not in itself increase the opportunities available to women and minority stu-
dents.131 Second, “there are no benefits to women of contacting female faculty 
nor to Black or Hispanic students of contacting same-race faculty,” meaning 
that faculty of all backgrounds exhibit biases that hurt underrepresented student 
populations.132 Similar results appear in myriad studies.133 
While universities loudly proclaim the importance of ethnic and other 
forms of diversity, the implicit biases of faculty, staff, administrators, and stu-
dents systemically hinder university efforts to promote diversity and inclu-
sion.134 For example, implicit bias in the hiring process decreases the likelihood 
of recruiting a diverse faculty.135 Student admissions,136 campus policing,137 and 
                                                        
130  The emails were sent by researchers and were identical other than the names of fictitious 
senders, who were given names that accorded with racial stereotypes (such as “Lamar Wash-
ington” and “Brad Anderson”). See Katherine L. Milkman et al., What Happens Before? A 
Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the 
Pathway into Organizations, 100 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1678, 1678, 1683 (2015). 
131  Id. at 1704. 
132  Id. Whether these results truly are “counterintuitive” is a question for another time. Simi-
lar phenomena have been observed in other contexts. See, e.g., Rima Abdelkader, NY Cabbie 
Rep Defends Racial Profiling: ‘I’m Tired of Going to Funerals,’ THEGRIO (Dec. 8, 2010, 
8:10 a.m.), http://thegrio.com/2010/12/08/ny-taxi-driver-rep-im-tired-of-going-to-funerals/ 
[https://perma.cc/S3FP-MXTK]; Paul LaRosa, Almost No More White NYC Cab Drivers, but 
Blacks Still Can’t Catch a Ride?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpo 
st.com/paul-larosa/nyc-cab-drivers-blacks_b_6116602.html [https://perma.cc/98HU-
ADUM]. 
133  See, e.g., Donna K. Ginther et al., Race, Ethnicity, and NIH Research Awards, 333 SCI. 
1015 (2011) (reporting that black scholars receive less generous grant funding); Frances Trix 
& Carolyn Psenka, Exploring the Color of Glass: Letters of Recommendation for Female 
and Male Medical Faculty, 14 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 191, 191 (2003) (reporting that women 
receive inferior letters of recommendation). 
134  See, e.g., Daniel Solórzano et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and 
Campus Racial Climate: The Experiences of African American College Students, 69 J. 
NEGRO EDUC. 60, 60 (2000); Derald Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions and Difficult 
Dialogues on Race in the Classroom, 15 CULTURAL DIVERSITY ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 
183, 183 (2009). 
135  See, e.g., BENJAMIN D. REESE, JR., IMPLICIT ASSOCIATIONS: THE SEARCH PROCESS (JULY 
2013); REVIEWING APPLICANTS: RESEARCH ON BIAS AND ASSUMPTIONS, WOMEN SCI. & 
ENGINEERING LEADERSHIP INST., U. OF WIS.-MADISON (2012). 
136  See, e.g., Peter Schmidt, In Admission Decisions, the Deciders’ Own Backgrounds Play a 
Big Role, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/In-
Admission-Decisions-the/236088 [https://perma.cc/G7D7-FEAV] (describing study by Mi-
chael N. Bastedo & Nicholas A. Bowman). 
137  See, e.g., Rio Fernandes, How Bias Training Works in One Campus Police Department, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (May 16, 2016), http://chronicle.com/article/How-Bias-Training-
Works-in-One/236482 [https://perma.cc/D9JC-FVDB] (“The adoption of anti-bias training is 
not unusual among campus police forces across the country. . . .”). 
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selection of campus administrators all are affected by the biases of decision 
makers. Universities have responded to the dangers of implicit bias on several 
fronts. Search committee members now receive training on how to identify and 
resist implicit bias.138 Colleges give professors resources on how to “disrupt” 
implicit bias in the classroom.139 Students attend trainings on “cultural compe-
tency.”140 At Ohio State University, the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race 
and Ethnicity publishes State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review each year. 
The institute also conducts trainings designed to lessen the impact of implicit 
bias across the university (at OSU and elsewhere), with lessons related to ad-
missions, classroom teaching, and broader culture.141 In short, the effects of 
implicit bias on campus are pervasive, and thoughtful university leaders have 
begun responding to well-recognized problems. 
Anyone who has diligently ventured this far into this article can probably 
predict my next query: What are the odds that implicit bias does not infect the 
university disciplinary process? When examining real courts, scholars have 
long recognized the effects of unconscious racial bias on witness testimony,142 
and judges are increasingly open to expert testimony on this danger.143 Chances 
are, witnesses do not lose their unconscious biases upon entry to university 
property. Similarly, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges—even those out-
wardly committed to racial equality—exhibit racial biases that exacerbate the 
                                                        
138  I received the two pamphlets cited supra in note 135 when I joined the search committee 
seeking a chancellor for the University of Missouri. See also Lucy A. Leske, How Search 
Committees Can See Bias in Themselves, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (Nov. 30, 2016), 
http://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Search-Committees-Can-See/238532 
[https://perma.cc/EB8K-XVRP]; Best Practices: Faculty and Leadership Searches, YALE U. 
OFFICE PROVOST, 3 (2015) http://provost.yale.edu/sites/default/files/best_practices_for_cond 
ucting_faculty_and_leadership_searches_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WH4F-M3AU] (“Best 
Practices identifies factors that may interfere with the scholarly assessment of the candidate 
and provides strategies to address them.”). 
139  See, e.g., Disrupting Implicit Bias, DARTMOUTH CTR. ADVANCEMENT LEARNING 
https://dcal.dartmouth.edu/resources/teaching-dartmouth/disrupting-implicit-bias 
[https://perma.cc/F3FZ-N9YN] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
140  See, e.g., Vernita Bediako, Citizenship@Mizzou Encourages Diversity, Inclusion at 
Monday Evening Event, MANEATER (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.themaneater.com/stories/20 
17/1/31/citizenshipmizzou-encourages-diversity-inclusion-m [https://perma.cc/RGV4-GE 
77]; Kara Guzman, Cultural Competency Training Aims to Help Foster an Inclusive Culture, 
U. C. SANTA CRUZ NEWSCENTER (Sept. 28, 2016), http://news.ucsc.edu/2016/09/cultural-
competency-students.html [https://perma.cc/4RB2-VZ6P]. 
141  See generally About, OHIO ST. U. KIRWAN INST. STUD. RACE ETHNICITY at 
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/about [https://perma.cc/SUT5-MHEU] (last visited Nov. 24, 
2017) (describing research and outreach efforts). 
142  See generally Laura Connelly, Cross-Racial Identifications: Solutions to the “They All 
Look Alike” Effect, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 125 (2015); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial 
Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984). 
143  See State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 720–21, 723 (Conn. 2012); State v. Henderson, 27 
A.3d 872, 917, 925 (N.J. 2011). 
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injustice of the criminal court system.144 Scholars have documented race and 
sex biases in sexual harassment and assault proceedings.145 Chances are, Title 
IX office staff and other university officials possess similar biases, with similar 
results. 
In particular, when universities police sexual activity near the border of 
permissible and impermissible conduct, they magnify the dangers of implicit 
biases held by victims and other witnesses.146 In the case of a “stranger rape,” 
there is generally less confusion about whether a crime occurred; the issue is 
identifying the perpetrator. In the more common case of dorm room sexual ac-
tivity about which consent is disputed, cross-racial perceptions of dangerous-
ness and innocence on the part of witnesses can bring racial bias into the hear-
ing room. Similarly, for adjudications concerning university rules against 
behavior like harassment and sexual stalking—in which the subjective percep-
tions of alleged victims are often elements of the offense—racialized percep-
tions about whose sexual interest is legitimate and appropriate affect what con-
duct is reported and how investigators will perceive it. 
C. Definitions of Offenses Are Broad and Vague 
University definitions of offenses such as sexual harassment are often both 
broad and vague, giving immense discretion to Title IX officials who decide 
which students to charge. This parallels offenses for which black students are 
disproportionately punished in elementary and secondary schools, such as “dis-
respect,” “excessive noise,” and “defiance.”147 
Among other terms, “sexual harassment” and “stalking” can have broad 
definitions that include a great deal of conduct that many students might not 
expect to be prohibited. Campus definitions of sexual assault, which generally 
include sexual activity performed without consent, also cover conduct not in-
cluded in traditional criminal law definitions of rape and sexual assault, causing 
sexual activity that would be perfectly lawful if performed off campus by non-
students to become punishable if performed by students.148 This discrepancy 
results from campus definitions of consent that require more robust evidence of 
assent than is normally required in sex crime prosecutions, or even in civil liti-
                                                        
144  See L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Court-
room, 126 YALE L.J. 862, 867–69 (2017) (reviewing Nicole Van Cleve, Crook County: Rac-
ism and Injustice in America’s Largest Criminal Court (2016)). 
145  See Nicole E. Smith, The Old College Trial: Evaluating the Investigative Model for Ad-
judicating Claims of Sexual Misconduct, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 953, 970–71 (2017); Karl L. 
Wuensch et al., Racial Bias in Decisions Made by Mock Jurors Evaluating a Case of Sexual 
Harassment, 142 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 587, 594 (2002). 
146  The danger is further magnified by the language of university codes containing offenses 
with broad and vague definitions. See infra Section III.C. 
147  See Skiba et al., supra note 48 (finding that racial disparities are greater for offenses 
more “subjective in interpretation,” as opposed to more concrete violations like “smoking” 
and “vandalism”); see also Skiba supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
148  See infra Section III.C.3. 
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gation related to nonconsensual sex.149 This Subpart discusses three examples 
of campus offenses: sexual harassment, stalking, and sexual assault. It then re-
counts some lawsuits brought by students who challenged the imposition of 
campus discipline on the grounds that campus offenses are unduly broad or 
vague. 
1. Sexual Harassment 
Campus definitions of sexual harassment, if given their plain meaning, can 
cover totally innocuous conduct that could hardly be described as depriving 
someone of her equal access to educational opportunities. 
For example, at the University of Texas, “sexual harassment” includes 
“[u]nwelcome conduct of a sexual nature . . . intentionally directed towards a 
specific individual . . . [with the] effect of . . . creating an . . . offensive atmos-
phere.”150 By its terms, a single sexual advance that creates such an (undefined) 
offensive atmosphere could subject a student to discipline.151 
Clemson University defines “Sexual harassment” as “unwelcome conduct 
of a sexual nature,” and explains that the definition “includes unwelcome sexu-
al advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature including sexual violence.”152 If taken literally, the 
definition includes flirtation that is merely unwelcome—even if it causes no 
harm. 
At Syracuse University, sexual harassment until recently was defined as 
“unwelcome behavior of a sexual nature that relates to the gender or sexual 
identity of an individual.”153 University rules provided that “[e]ven without cre-
ating an intimidating or hostile environment for study, work, or social living, 
unwelcome behavior of a sexual nature is a violation.”154 Syracuse thus went 
                                                        
149  Id. 
150  See Univ. of Texas at Austin, Prohibition of Sexual Discrimination, Sexual Harassment, 
Sexual Assault, Sexual Misconduct, Interpersonal Violence, and Stalking, 
https://policies.utexas.edu/policies/prohibition-sexual-discrimination-sexual-harassment-
sexual-assault-sexual-misconduct [https://perma.cc/4DNE-4FSU] (last visited Nov. 24, 
2017). 
151  A separate section listing examples of what “sexual harassment may include” suggests 
that the “frequency and severity” of “verbal conduct” may affect whether speech constitutes 
sexual harassment. Id. But that is far from clear, and neither frequency nor severity is includ-
ed in the definition of the offense. 
152  See Clemson Univ., Anti-Harassment and Non-Discrimination Policy, 
http://www.clemson.edu/campus-life/campus-services/access/anti-harassment-policy.html 
[https://perma.cc/34BG-R2PW] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
153  See Syracuse University Information Regarding Sexual Misconduct and Other Types of 
Harassment and Discrimination, http://earthsciences.syr.edu/academics/PDFs/SU%20Info% 
20Sexual%20misconduct%20and%20other.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6RB-K446] (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2017). Current policy uses different language. See Sexual Harassment, Abuse, and 
Assault Prevention, Syracuse Univ. Policies, http://supolicies.syr.edu/studs/sexual_harass. 
htm [https://perma.cc/TU5W-7QL6] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
154  See Syracuse University Information, supra note 153. 
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beyond Texas and Clemson, both of which merely allowed speculation (per-
haps unwarranted) that their codes of conduct might subject students to disci-
pline for isolated acts of harmless, unwelcome flirtation. 
In disclaiming the need for a hostile environment, Syracuse echoed the 
language of the U.S Department of Justice’s letter to the University of New 
Mexico, which chastised the university for saying otherwise.155 According to 
the DOJ letter, New Mexico’s “policies mistakenly indicate[d] that unwelcome 
conduct of a sexual nature does not constitute sexual harassment until it causes 
a hostile environment or unless it is quid pro quo.”156 The letter continued, 
“[u]nwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, however, constitutes sexual harass-
ment regardless of whether it causes a hostile environment or is quid pro 
quo.”157 To support this interpretation, the DOJ letter quoted from DOE Office 
for Civil Rights (OCR) guidance contained in a 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter. 
Indeed, federal guidance defines sexual harassment as “unwelcome conduct of a 
sexual nature. It includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, such as 
sexual assault or acts of sexual violence.” 
Hostile environment is not part of the definition of sexual harassment, nor is it 
required for “unwanted conduct of a sexual nature to be deemed sexual harass-
ment.”158 
Taken together, the DOJ and DOE guidance provide that some “verbal . . . 
conduct of a sexual nature” can constitute sexual harassment under university 
regulations even if it does not cause a hostile environment.159 Indeed, some 
such conduct must constitute sexual harassment if a university wishes to avoid 
federal sanctions. 
Further, in the event that creating a “hostile environment” remains an ele-
ment of “sexual harassment,” the term “hostile environment” must itself be de-
fined. An overbroad definition of “hostile environment” eliminates the benefits 
that might come from the phrase’s retention, and federal regulators have stated 
that broad definitions are required. In their compliance letter to the University 
of Montana, the DOJ and DOE OCR demanded expansion of the “sexual har-
                                                        
155  See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. to President Robert G. Frank, 
Univ. of N.M. 2 (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/843901/download 
[https://perma.cc/WXF7-CEFM]. 
156  See id. at 9. 
157  Id. (emphasis added). 
158  Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t Educ. Office for Civil Rights, “Dear Colleague” Letter (Apr. 4, 
2011) http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.html [https://per 
ma.cc/9UKC-77LU]); see also Comm. A on Acad. Freedom & Tenure & Comm. on Women 
in the Acad. Profession, supra note 13, at 77. On September 22, 2017, U.S. Dep’t Educ. Re-
scinded the April 4, 2011 “Dear Colleague” guidance document. See U.S. Dep’t Educ. Of-
fice for Civil Rights, “Dear Colleague” letter (Sept. 22, 2017). OCR also issued some interim 
guidance on the same day. See id. 
159  See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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assment” definition used at that institution.160 The university had defined “hos-
tile environment” as being “severe and pervasive,” and the federal regulators 
wrote that the phrase must be replaced with “severe or pervasive.”161 The regu-
lators also stated that the Montana agreement “will serve as a blueprint for col-
leges and universities throughout the country to protect students from sexual 
harassment and assault.”162 
Based on this guidance, it no longer seems far-fetched to suggest that UT 
Austin or Clemson might punish a single unwanted sexual advance that turns 
out to be somewhat offensive as sexual harassment.163 Even if university offi-
cials have no intention of doing so, a student could be excused for fearing the 
worst. 
2. Stalking 
The term “stalking,” as commonly used in statutes, generally refers to a 
course of conduct directed at another person that the perpetrator knows (or 
should have known) would cause the victim reasonable fear for her safety or 
the safety of another.164 State court opinions provide guidance concerning what 
constitutes a reasonable fear and how much evidence is necessary to establish 
the required culpable mental state. Campus definitions, however, can cover far 
less serious conduct. 
In Arizona, for example, criminal law defines stalking in a fairly standard 
way, covering “a course of conduct that is directed toward another person . . . 
[when] that conduct causes the victim” serious emotional harm or a reasonable 
fear of physical injury or damage to property.165 
At the University of Arizona, by contrast, the list of prohibited behavior in 
the student code of conduct includes, “Stalking or engaging in repeated or sig-
nificant behavior toward another individual, whether in person, in writing, or 
through electronic means, after having been asked to stop, or doing so to such a 
degree that a reasonable person, subject to such contact, would regard the con-
                                                        
160  Letter from U.S. Dep’t Justice Civil Rights Div. & U.S. Dep’t Educ. Office for Civil 
Rights to President Royce Engstrom, Univ. of Mont. (May 9, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2013/05/09/um-ltr-findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF53-SC7F]; 
see also Comm. A on Acad. Freedom & Tenure & Comm. on Women in the Acad. Profes-
sion, supra note 13, at 77. 
161  See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civil Rights Div. & U.S. Dep’t Ed. Office for Civil Rights, supra 
note 160, at 5 (emphasis added). The compliance letter demanded this change despite U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent using the “severe and pervasive” language, stating that subsequent 
agency guidance had superseded the Court’s interpretation of the statute. See id. at 5 nn.8, 9. 
162  Id.; see Richard Hanley, Title IX, Sexual Harassment, and Academic Freedom: What No 
One Seems to Understand, 6 AAUP J. ACAD. FREEDOM 1, 3 (2015) (decrying the Montana 
agreement and its use as a “blueprint”). 
163  See supra text accompanying notes 150-151. 
164  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2923 (2016); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (2008); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 120.45 (2014). 
165  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2923 (2016). 
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tact as unwanted.”166 Under this definition, even if a student has never been 
asked to stop or been told his behavior is problematic, the student can violate 
the university code if a reasonable person would consider the behavior “un-
wanted.” No objective or subjective fear of harm, much less actual harm, is re-
quired before the school may impose discipline for apparently “unwanted” acts. 
A more thorough analysis of Missouri law, both in statute and in campus 
rules, illustrates how a broad university “stalking” definition can encompass 
conduct well outside the definitions applied by real courts to offenses with the 
same name. 
The University of Missouri defines “Stalking on the Basis of Sex” as “fol-
lowing or engaging in a course of conduct on the basis of sex with no legiti-
mate purpose that makes another person reasonably concerned for their safety 
or would cause a reasonable person under the circumstances to be frightened, 
intimidated or emotionally distressed.”167 Neither “legitimate purpose” nor 
“emotionally distressed” are defined.168 
Missouri statutory law uses similar definitions of stalking in other contexts, 
both to define stalking crimes and to explain when courts may issue orders of 
protection against stalkers. The criminal offense of stalking in the second de-
gree is defined as follows: “A person commits the offense of stalking in the se-
cond degree if he or she purposely, through his or her course of conduct, dis-
turbs, or follows with the intent to disturb another person.”169 The term 
“disturb” means “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person 
that serves no legitimate purpose and that would cause a reasonable person un-
der the circumstances to be frightened, intimidated, or emotionally dis-
tressed.”170 
A person who wonders just what constitutes “stalking” in Missouri but is 
unsatisfied with the definitions above need not despair. Missouri courts have 
helped to explain the statutory language through case law. For example, in 
State v. Magalif, the Missouri Court of Appeals noted that the state “General 
Assembly did not define ‘substantial emotional distress’ in § 565.225,” then 
proceeded to adopt a definition from another statute, and then quoted approv-
                                                        
166  See STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT 5-308(F)(20) (UNIV. of ARIZ., 2015), 
http://www.titleix.arizona.edu/code_of_student_conduct [https://perma.cc/82WD-N49W] 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2017). Confusingly, the code also contains another definition of stalk-
ing more similar to the criminal statute. See id. at (E)(18). The university quotes the broader 
offense definition in an online listing of student conduct violations that “may be applicable 
to Title IX-related concerns.” See id. 
167  See COLLECTED RULES & REG. 600.020(B)(4) (UNIV. of MO., 2017), https://www.umsyst 
em.edu/ums/rules/collected_rules/equal_employment_educational_opportunity/ch600/600.0
20_sex_discrimination_sexual_harassment_and_sexual_misconduct [https://perma.cc/5DKD 
-K972]. 
168  In the university’s defense, the Missouri criminal statutes defining “stalking” use the 
same language. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.227, 565.225 (effective Aug. 28, 2017). 
169  MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.227.1. (effective Aug. 28, 2017). 
170  MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.225.1. (effective Aug. 28, 2017). 
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ingly from a court decision construing the statute from which it adopted the 
definition.171 The court held that to satisfy the statutory definition, the defend-
ant’s conduct “must be such as would produce a considerable or significant 
amount of emotional distress in a reasonable person; something markedly 
greater than the level of uneasiness, nervousness, unhappiness or the like which 
are commonly experienced in day to day living.”172 And in State v. Martin, the 
Court of Appeals rejected a defendant’s effort to define “substantial emotional 
distress” in a way that would require “a substantial risk of temporary or perma-
nent medical or psychological damage, manifested by impairment of a behav-
ioral, cognitive or physical condition,” holding that the crime of stalking in-
cluded conduct with less severe effects.173 With these and other cases,174 
prosecutors, police officers, and ordinary citizens can—with some effort—
predict what conduct is covered by the statute and can conform their conduct 
accordingly. Even without accepting the legal fiction that everyone is aware of 
the law, including judicial glosses on statutory terms, one can appreciate the 
benefit that reasoned court opinions provide. 
The term “stalking” has importance beyond the criminal court; judges must 
apply it when deciding whether to issue orders of protection against accused 
stalkers. For this purpose, Missouri defines “stalking” as “when any person 
purposely engages in an unwanted course of conduct that causes alarm to an-
other person, or a person who resides together in the same household with the 
person seeking the order of protection when it is reasonable in that person’s sit-
uation to have been alarmed by the conduct.”175 Because the distinction be-
tween stalking and annoying-yet-lawful behavior is not always obvious, Mis-
souri courts have repeatedly differentiated between stalking and behavior that 
causes “the level of uneasiness, nervousness, unhappiness or the like which are 
commonly experienced in day to day living,” holding that the second category 
does not justify issuance of protective orders.176 For example, “Repeated com-
                                                        
171  See State v. Magalif, 131 S.W.3d 431, 435–36 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). The Magalif court 
was interpreting slightly different language than that in the current statute. See State v. Joyn-
er, 458 S.W.3d 875, 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that “prior to 2008, the State had to 
prove that a defendant’s course of conduct in fact caused a victim to suffer ‘substantial emo-
tional distress’ [rather than mere “emotional distress”], after 2008, the State was relieved of 
this burden). Its reasoning could nonetheless be instructive. 
172  Magalif, 131 S.W.3d at 435–36 (quoting Wallace v. Van Pelt, 969 S.W.2d 380, 385–86 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998)). This definition has continued to be quoted in Missouri court opinions 
after the 2008 amendment mentioned supra note 171. See, e.g., Lawyer v. Fino, 459 S.W.3d 
528, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
173  See State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 6, 8–9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
174  See, e.g., Overstreet v. Kixmiller, 120 S.W.3d 257, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing 
what activity is “legitimate”); Girard v. Girard, 54 S.W.3d 203, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) 
(same); State v. Baker, 40 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing “emotional dis-
tress”). 
175  MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010(14) (effective Aug. 28, 2016). 
176  See, e.g., Lawyer, 459 S.W.3d at 532; Brockert v. Syler, 95 S.W.3d 187, 193 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
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munication alone . . . typically does not rise to the level of harassment because, 
while annoying and boorish, such conduct would not cause substantial emo-
tional distress in a reasonable person.”177 
The discussion above illustrates that in real Missouri courts, whether crim-
inal court or family court, persons accused of “stalking” have ample case law 
with which they can compare their conduct to that already reviewed by judges 
applying state statutes. By contrast, in the university disciplinary system, a stu-
dent accused of stalking would discover an offense lacking definitions for key 
terms such as “legitimate purpose.”178 Then, because the records of prior cam-
pus cases are confidential and in any event lack the sort of reasoned statutory 
analysis useful in defining ambiguous terms, the accused would have no case 
law available to resolve his confusion. As a result, the practical definition of 
“stalking” on campus is largely at the discretion of university staff. Further, 
Missouri is not special in this regard; I chose the example because I live here 
and have some familiarity with its criminal statutes. If one chooses some other 
state at random, state courts there are nearly certain to have defined “stalking” 
at length in a variety of contexts, and university officials are nearly certain not 
to have done so in any documents accessible to most persons regulated by uni-
versity codes of conduct. 
3. Sexual Misconduct, Sexual Assault, and Rape 
Broad definitions also plague the most serious campus sexual offenses, in-
cluding sexual misconduct, sexual assault, and rape. In a recent New York case, 
for example, the issue before a hearing board at SUNY Potsdam was whether a 
sexual encounter between students was consensual.179 Because the university’s 
code of conduct prohibits “[a]ny sexual act that occurs without the consent of 
the victim or that occurs when the victim is unable to give consent,”180 and con-
sent was disputed, the hearing board applied the code’s definition of consent. 
Stating that consent cannot be inferred from silence or mere lack of objection, 
the code requires that consent be shown with “spoken words or behavior that 
indicates, without doubt to either party, a mutual agreement to” engage in sexu-
al activity.181 This definition of consent is quite narrow compared to those tradi-
tionally applied by courts in sex crime cases.182 As a result, a great deal of con-
duct that could not be punished criminally—even if there were no questions of 
                                                        
177  See Lawyer, 459 S.W.3d at 532 (collecting cases). 
178  See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. 
179  See Haug v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 149 A.D.3d 1200, 1202 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2017). 
180  See SUNY POTSDAM, STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT 18, 22, 25 (2014). 
181  See Haug, 149 A.D.3d at 1201. 
182  See generally State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219, 229 (Idaho 2013) (reviewing development of 
rape law in recent decades, particularly the “resistance requirement”); RICHARD J. BONNIE ET 
AL., CRIMINAL LAW 725–30 (4th ed. 2015). 
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proving what occurred—violates the university rules governing sex between 
students.183 
Reasonable minds may differ concerning how colleges should regulate sex 
on campus.184 It is beyond debate, however, that many campuses prohibit sexu-
al activity that would be perfectly lawful if conducted outside the reach of uni-
versity rules. This should not cause surprise. Advocates have sought changes to 
university regulation of campus sex precisely because they disliked existing 
rules that more closely mirrored criminal law.185 The resulting broader defini-
tions of prohibited sexual activity then apply on campus to offenses with famil-
iar names like “sexual assault” that upon inspection are quite different from of-
fenses with such names that might be adjudicated in real courts. A brief essay 
by Brett A. Sokolow and Daniel C. Swinton illustrates the confusion that occa-
sionally results.186 Sokolow and Swinton are consultants at the NCHERM 
Group, which travels the country helping universities (at great expense) con-
form their sex regulations to the suggestions of the Department of Education.187 
The group coordinates with ATIXA, the Association of Title IX Administra-
tors, to advise universities on how to address campus sexual misconduct.188 In 
their analysis of a Tennessee case in which a state judge reversed a university’s 
expulsion decision,189 Sokolow and Swinton observed that “[a]ffirmative con-
sent (or consent as we call it) in the sexual context is a concept somewhat for-
eign to legal circles and that foreignness is apparent in the Chancery Court’s 
decision.”190 Sokolow and Swinton also noted that the university’s definition of 
affirmative consent, “words or actions unmistakable in their meaning,” while a 
                                                        
183  See N.Y. Penal Law § 130.05 (McKinney 2013) (defining “lack of consent” and stating 
that even if “not specifically stated, it is an element of every [sexual] offense . . . that the 
sexual act was committed without consent of the victim.”). 
184  See Ian Urbina, The Challenge of Defining Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/sunday-review/being-clear-about-rape.html 
[https://perma.cc/7SKG-XX47] (discussing adoption of “yes means yes” standard at public 
universities in New York and California). 
185  See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, For the Title IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations 
and Cautions, 125 YALE L.J. F. 281, 301 (2016) (suggesting that “the victories of the Title 
IX movement thus far could be leveraged to press for direct changes and reform of consent 
standards in state criminal codes”). 
186  Brett A. Sokolow & Daniel C. Swinton, Response to Corey Mock v. Univ. of Tennessee, 
Chattanooga, NCHERM GROUP (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.ncherm.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/TNG-TOW-08-172015-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M6Q-22Z2]. 
187  NCHERM stands for National Center for Higher Education Risk Management. See, e.g., 
Ashley Jost, UM System Paying Almost $500,000 for Title IX Consultation, Development, 
COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Sept. 8, 2014, 12:01 AM) http://www.columbiatribune.com/a45c757c-
7e70-50c7-95d6-a8a9657dbba1.html [https://perma.cc/8ZUR-LJS5]. 
188  See NCHERM GROUP, https://www.ncherm.org [https://perma.cc/R8Q3-ETVJ] (last vis-
ited Nov. 24, 2017) (“The NCHERM Group and ATIXA have developed an approach called 
the One Policy, One Process Model . . .”). 
189  See Mock v. Univ. of Tenn. at Chattanooga, No. 14-1687-II at 23 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 4, 
2015). 
190  See Sokolow & Swinton, supra note 186. 
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“formulation . . . popular on some campuses,” is “unwise in a policy context” 
because little in the sexual context is “unmistakable.”191 One might observe that 
higher education consultants have a financial interest in observing that a “popu-
lar” definition of campus sexual misconduct exposes universities to liability 
risks that could shrink with the right sort of help from outside experts. A less 
cynical takeaway is that even in the eyes of reform advocates who champion 
“affirmative consent” as campus policy, many universities use overly narrow 
definitions of consent, which means that they have overly broad definitions of 
nonconsensual sex, which justifies expulsion when found.192 
In addition to breadth, definitions of sexual misconduct may also suffer 
from vagueness similar to that already discussed for the offenses of sexual har-
assment and stalking. In Doe v. Western New England University, the court 
considered a case brought by a student a university found to have “pressur[ed] 
[another] for sex in violation” of university rules.193 The court concluded, “At a 
minimum, the [university] Handbook’s standards regarding coercion are am-
biguous.”194 
4. Litigation Related to Offense Definitions 
Some students have brought legal challenges to the language of university 
behavior codes, thereby exposing them to judicial scrutiny and causing some to 
be stricken as unenforceable.195 It appears that despite court rulings dating at 
least to 1989, many university codes contain offenses with definitions incom-
patible with the First Amendment and other constitutional guarantees.196 
In addition, the expansive definitions applied by university officials to am-
biguous student conduct provisions makes litigation more likely than would 
more judicious interpretation. Unlike actual statutes, which, if ambiguous, can 
occasionally be understood with greater precision after reading court opinions, 
university codes of conduct lack a body of case law to which a student or his 
lawyer might turn. Instead, interpretation is vested in university officials, often 
                                                        
191  Id. 
192  Even an “affirmative consent” standard does not prohibit enough campus sex for some 
advocates. See, e.g., Cantalupo, supra note 185, at 298 (quoting approvingly federal guid-
ance to the effect that “[a]cquiescence in the conduct” is not enough to prove “welcome-
ness,” which is described as a better standard for campus sex regulation). 
193  See Doe v. W. New England Univ., 228 F. Supp. 3d 154, 174, (D. Mass. 2017). 
194  Id. Additional instances of ambiguous conduct offenses appear in the next section. 
195  DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 305, 317, 320 (3d Cir. 2008); UWM Post, Inc. v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1180 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (finding 
university policy overbroad and applicable to protected speech); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 
F. Supp. 852, 853, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (finding that university’s anti-harassment policy 
“swept within its scope a significant amount of ‘verbal conduct’ or ‘verbal behavior’ which 
is unquestionably protected speech under the First Amendment.”). 
196  See Benjamin Dower, The Scylla of Sexual Harassment and the Charybdis of Free 
Speech: How Public Universities Can Craft Policies to Avoid Liability, 31 REV. LITIG. 703, 
728 (2012). 
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without legal training, who make ad hoc decisions with no precedential authori-
ty. Occasionally, these interpretations receive judicial review during litigation 
related to a student discipline case. 
In Doe v. Amherst College, for example, an expelled student questioned 
whether a student handbook definition of sexual misconduct “include[d] a 
knowledge requirement,” asking in particular whether a student who was 
“blacked out” drunk could possess the needed culpable mental state.197 Doe’s 
argument was that because he was blacked out, he was not capable of commit-
ting sexual misconduct and was, if anything, a victim of the less-intoxicated 
woman with whom he engaged in sexual activity.198 At the motion-to-dismiss 
stage, the court held that Doe’s “proposed reading of 
the Policy and Procedures is not unreasonable” and allowed him to proceed 
with his breach of contract claim concerning alleged misinterpretation of the 
Amherst College sexual misconduct definition.199 
In Mock v. University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, a Tennessee court set 
aside a student’s expulsion in part because, according to the judge, the universi-
ty misapplied its definition of “consent.”200 Among other concerns, the judge 
noted that the university chancellor appeared to rely upon articles promoting 
the use of a consent definition different from that in the university rules.201 
An older case, decided before modern Title IX enforcement at universities 
was underway, illustrates how well-meaning administrators can violate stu-
dents’ rights while pursuing gender equity.202 In 1991, a fraternity chapter at 
George Mason University—a public university in Virginia—performed a skit 
offensive to women and minority students (as well as to those who appreciate 
quality skits).203 The university received student complaints and decided that 
the fraternity’s “behavior had created a hostile learning environment for women 
and blacks, incompatible with the University’s mission.”204 GMU then pun-
ished the fraternity by prohibiting most of its social activities and requiring it 
“to plan and implement an educational program addressing cultural differences, 
diversity, and the concerns of women.”205 A United States District Judge and a 
                                                        
197  See Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 216 (D. Mass. 2017). 
198  Id. at 224. Because the female student was less drunk than Doe, and the college chose to 
charge him with misconduct while not charging her with taking advantage of Doe’s inca-
pacitation, Doe alleged gender discrimination. 
199  Id. at 218. 
200  Mock v. Univ. of Tenn. at Chattanooga, No. 14-1687-II at 20 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 4, 
2015). 
201  See id. at 19–20. 
202  See Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 393 
(4th Cir. 1993) (holding that university engaged in unlawful viewpoint discrimination when 
punishing student group). 
203  See id. at 387–88 (describing skit as well as fraternity’s subsequent admission that it 
“was sophomoric and offensive”). 
204  Id. at 388. 
205  Id. 
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unanimous three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals then agreed that the skit, 
while “an exercise of teenage campus excess,” was protected by the First 
Amendment and could not justify punishment by the university.206 While it is 
possible that GMU’s decision was motivated by the desire of bluenoses to sup-
press free expression, I suspect that instead, university officials happened to 
pursue legitimate goals (such as promoting an inclusive environment and op-
posing sexism and racism) in an unlawful manner. The Fourth Circuit ob-
served, “The University certainly has a substantial interest in maintaining an 
educational environment free of discrimination and racism, and in providing 
gender-neutral education. Yet it seems equally apparent that it has available 
numerous alternatives to imposing punishment on students based on the view-
points they express.”207 Now, as then, university officials applying vague and 
broad campus regulations may well violate student rights. 
D. The Process Is Conducted in Secret 
If sunshine is the best disinfectant,208 university tribunals need substantial 
doses of hydrogen peroxide. For perfectly sensible reasons—including student 
privacy rights protected by FERPA—interested parties may not sashay into 
university disciplinary hearings to assess the acumen of hearing examiners.209 
This restriction comes at a cost, however. If a student is treated unfairly, out-
side observers will not have the chance to see and object.210 Opacity com-
pounds at those universities choosing neither to produce word-for-word tran-
scripts of their proceedings nor to make recordings. 
After the hearing, when some university official decides whether the ac-
cused is “responsible” and, if so, what punishment to impose, no written opin-
ion will announce the result to the public. As a result, one cannot learn what the 
normal or standard punishment is for various wrongs.211 This creates particular 
                                                        
206  Id. at 389, 393; Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 773 F. 
Supp. 792, 795 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
207  Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity, 993 F.3d at 393. 
208  See Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY. (Dec. 20, 1913) (“Pub-
licity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to 
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”). 
209  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
210  Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial”). 
211  An annual report listing punishments imposed for various offenses is not especially help-
ful. Because the offenses are defined so broadly and vaguely, one cannot guess from the bare 
naming of an offense what a particular student did to become guilty of “harassment” or 
“sexual stalking.” See, e.g., UNIV. OF MO., TITLE IX OFFICE, MU TITLE IX OFFICE ANNUAL 
REPORT 27 (Sept. 17, 2015) (describing results of cases in general terms and stating, “[w]hen 
found responsible, Respondents were sanctioned by suspension from the University or other 
discretionary sanctions.”). Even a more robust report, such as that from Yale, does not allow 
apples-to-apples comparisons of cases. See, e.g., YALE UNIV., REPORT OF COMPLAINTS OF 
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 13 (Dec. 31, 2016) (“A G&P student reported that a faculty member 
made inappropriate comments and made unwanted physical contact with the complainant . . . 
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challenges when students found guilty must debate with the Title IX office 
about what punishment is appropriate. A few examples of university policies 
setting forth potential sanctions will illustrate the difficulty. 
At Clemson, students are informed that those “found to be in violation of 
[university] policy will be subject to immediate and appropriate disciplinary 
action, proportional to the seriousness of the offense. . . . Possible sanctions in-
clude but are not limited to reprimand, disciplinary probation, suspension, or 
dismissal.”212 At Nebraska, “Institutional sanctions that may be imposed 
against students for sexual misconduct range from warning to expulsion.”213 
Unlike in real courts, where sentences are generally cabined by statutory max-
imums that vary by offense, university authorities commonly receive little 
guidance on what punishment fits what offense.214 
Constraints on discretion exist largely in what could be described as a sort 
of common law of prior decisions, remembered with varying degrees of accu-
racy by a small portion of those involved in the process. In my own undergrad-
uate days, I served on the Yale College Executive Committee, which heard stu-
dent disciplinary cases. It was common for students caught dead to rights to, in 
effect, “plead guilty” by admitting a violation and then come before the com-
mittee only for imposition of sanction. In my experience, the dean’s office sec-
retary who informed the committee what had been done in similar prior cases 
was among the most powerful persons in the room, despite having no vote. 
Because the range of possible punishment is so broad, a student accused of 
sexual harassment or misconduct might wish to read detailed descriptions of 
the conduct previously punished by the university. Beyond giving the student a 
sense of what may be in store for him, this information could help the student 
articulate arguments about what sanction is appropriate in his case. As de-
scribed above, however, this information is normally not available. After a sen-
tence is imposed, the lack of comparators will hinder the student’s ability to 
appeal on the theory that his punishment is outside the norm for similar behav-
ior.215 Although some university codes explicitly list this potential ground for 
                                                                                                                                 
After consulting with the complainant, the Title IX coordinator counseled the respondent on 
appropriate conduct.”). 
212  See Clemson Univ., supra note 152 at 9. 
213  See UNIV. OF NEB., SEXUAL MISCONDUCT POLICY, 3 (2014), https://nebraska.edu/docs/hr/ 
NU_Sexual_Misconduct_Policy_2014_0530.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J83-XRE7]. 
214  See, e.g., UNIV. OF MO. SYS., COLLECTED RULES & REGULATIONS, § 600.030(Q)(1)(b) 
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.umsystem.edu/ums/rules/collected_rules/equal_employment_ed 
ucational_opportunity/ch600/600.030_equity_resolution_process_for_resolving_complaints 
_of_harassment [https://perma.cc/76M9-LPJM]. 
215  See, e.g., id. § (S)(1)(c) (listing as potential ground for appeal that “sanctions fall outside 
the range typically imposed for this offense, or for the cumulative conduct record of the Re-
spondent”); COLL. OF WESTCHESTER, TITLE IX POLICY PROHIBITING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, https://www.cw.edu/prohibition-sexual-discrimination 
[https://perma.cc/XD98-65D2] (including same ground for appeal); N. ILL. UNIV., TITLE 
IX/SEXUAL MISCONDUCT POLICY AND COMPLAINT PROCEDURES FOR EMPLOYEES AND 
STUDENTS (Dec. 1, 2016), http://niu.edu/sexualmisconduct/overview/TitleIX-Sexual-
18 NEV. L.J. 107, TRACHTENBERG - FINAL 12/14/17  5:53 PM 
Fall 2017] UNIVERSITY TITLE IX ENFORCEMENT 143 
appeal, the promise is empty without access to sealed case files or, at a mini-
mum, some redacted version of case files that allows comparisons. 
Predictions that discipline records might prove difficult to obtain have 
proven accurate when activists and litigators have sought access.216 The Uni-
versity of Kentucky successfully sued its student newspaper to prevent report-
ers from seeing records related to allegations against James Harwood, a former 
faculty member accused of sexually assaulting students.217 The court held that 
even if records were redacted to remove the names of complainants and other 
identifying details, release would violate student privacy law.218 Other universi-
ties have similarly refused to release records in high-profile cases—such as the 
Baylor University investigation that led to the dismissal of its president and 
head football coach—arguing that student records are exempt from disclo-
sure.219 Relatedly, male students alleging that student disciplinary processes are 
biased against men have struggled to prove disparate treatment because they 
cannot access records of “female comparators” accused of misconduct.220 Al-
though some courts have allowed such claims to reach discovery,221 others have 
deemed “the absence of specific factual allegations from which a factfinder 
could plausibly infer the influence of gender bias on the outcome of Plaintiff’s 
disciplinary proceeding” to be a fatal weakness.222 
                                                                                                                                 
Misconduct-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA2X-JLWE] (“The sanction(s) is/are inappropri-
ate or disproportionate to the determined finding(s)”); BOS. UNIV., STUDENT SEXUAL 
MISCONDUCT PROCEDURES (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.bu.edu/safety/sexual-misconduct/title-
ix-bu-policies/student-sexual-misconduct-procedures [https://perma.cc/DMN3-PQHF] (“The 
sanction imposed is disproportionate to the violation”). 
216  See Jake New, Protecting Student Privacy, or Reputation?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 25, 
2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/25/judge-sides-university-kentucky-
lawsuit-against-student-newspaper-over-sexual [https://perma.cc/4U96-V9ZF]. 
217  See id.; Paidin Dermody, Judge Rules in Favor of UK in Harwood Open Records Case, 
KY. KERNEL (Jan. 24, 2017) http://www.kykernel.com/news/judge-rules-in-favor-of-uk-in-
harwood-open-records/article_b4a9a306-e25f-11e6-a83c-73ddde751caf.html [https://perma. 
cc/G3PM-3GCR]. 
218  See Univ. of Ky. v. Kernel Press, Inc., No. 16-CI-3229 at 10 (Fayette Cir. Ct. Jan. 23, 
2017). 
219  See New, supra note 216. 
220  See, e.g., Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185, 186 (D. R.I. 2016) (discussing 
what qualifies as “ ‘particular circumstances suggesting that gender bias was a motivating 
factor behind the erroneous finding’ ” and noting that “absent any female comparators at the 
pleading stage,” courts have sometimes granted motions to dismiss); see also Yusuf v. Vas-
sar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1994). 
221  See, e.g., Doe v. Colum. Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that public criti-
cism of university and pressure for tougher enforcement supports inference of sex discrimi-
nation); Neal v. Colo. State Univ.-Pueblo, No. 16-CV-873-RM-CBS, 2017 WL 633045, at 
*9–*14 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2017) (Mag. recommendation) (recommending against dismissal 
of plaintiff’s claim and collecting cases addressing this issue). 
222  See Doe v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 240 F. Supp. 3d 984, 991–93 (D. Minn. 2017); Doe v. 
Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, No. 14-30143-MGM, 2015 WL 4306521, at *9 (D. Mass. July 14, 
2015); Doe v. Colum. Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d 831 F.3d 
46 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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If journalists investigating the Baylor football team have failed to obtain 
student conduct records of tremendous interest to sports fans, and plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have failed to find “female comparators” to support their client’s gen-
der-discrimination claims, one can safely assume that the average college stu-
dent cannot possibly know what happens at her institution. Nor can faculty 
who, armed with sufficient data, might participate in “shared governance” re-
lated to student discipline. 
E. Procedures Are Informal and Not Uniform 
Although some campus Title IX offices are surely models of professional-
ism, and some universities run excellent hearings that protect the rights of 
complainants and accused students alike, not every campus boasts a combina-
tion of investigation and adjudication that gives confidence in the likelihood of 
fair results. For example, some universities have procedures giving accused 
students minimal time to review discovery before their hearings.223 Some uni-
versities prohibit students from bringing lawyers to their hearings, and others 
allow lawyers to attend but disallow them from speaking.224 Hearsay is freely 
admitted, with university investigators reporting about interviews of absent 
witnesses whom the accused has never met.225 Appellate review is spotty, with 
students who appeal subjected to enhanced punishments.226 
Because the bulk of student conduct cases are conducted in secret and pro-
duce sealed records, one hesitates to draw sweeping conclusions about the na-
ture of the proceedings, which vary in quality from time to time and from place 
to place. On occasion, however, litigation filed in real courts allows parties to 
obtain university records through discovery, and judicial opinions describe their 
contents. The news is not encouraging. 
In 2017, a federal judge in Massachusetts denied a motion to dismiss sub-
mitted by Amherst College in response to a lawsuit filed by a student expelled 
from the college.227 Finding that the student had “alleged facts from which a 
jury could reasonably infer the College acted in a manner that prevented him 
from receiving the ‘thorough, impartial and fair’ investigation promised in 
the Student Handbook and thereby also denied him a fair adjudication of the 
complaint against him,” the judge allowed the case to proceed to discovery.228 
                                                        
223  See infra notes 229, 234, and accompanying text. 
224  See infra Section III.F. 
225  See, e.g., Doe v. Regents of the U.C., No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL at 3 (Cal. 
Super. Ct., July 10, 2015). 
226  See Haug v. State Univ. N.Y Potsdam, 149 A.D.3d 1200, 1203 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 6, 
2017) (“Upon petitioner’s appeal from the decision of the Hearing Board, the Appellate 
Board, sua sponte and without any explanation, recommended enhancing the penalty to ex-
pulsion.”); Regents of the U.C., No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL at 5 (finding that “the 
university abused its discretion in increasing sanctions after appeal without explanation”). 
227  See Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195 (D. Mass. 2017). 
228  Id. at 220. 
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Among the evidence mentioned by the judge was: the college gave Doe less 
than a week to respond to the initial accusation;229 led Doe to believe that con-
fidentiality rules prohibited him from conducting his own investigation;230 al-
lowed its own lawyer to attend the disciplinary hearing while Doe’s lawyer 
could not;231 and prevented Doe from offering newly-discovered evidence, the 
existence of which became known during the hearing and soon afterward.232 
The new information included evidence that a campus student activist running 
a “very public campaign to see a male student expelled for sexual assault” had 
edited the accuser’s complaint against Doe, as well as text messages indicating 
that the accuser had initiated the sexual activity found by the college to be non-
consensual.233 
The seven-day period granted to Doe to respond to the accusations may 
seem unusual, but similar windows actually are quite common in Title IX cas-
es.234 These very tight deadlines likely result from pressure on universities by 
the DOE OCR to resolve cases quickly, normally within sixty days. Although 
the OCR stated that it “does not require a school to complete investigations 
within 60 days” and instead judges promptness on a case-by-case basis, institu-
tions have also been told that sixty days is sufficient “in typical cases” and that 
the “60-calendar day timeframe refers to the entire investigation process.”235 
The OCR has explained further that while “this timeframe does not include ap-
peals, a school should be aware that an unduly long appeals process may im-
pact whether the school’s response was prompt and equitable as required by Ti-
tle IX.”236 The incentive for universities to move the Title IX business along is 
quite strong. 
                                                        
229  See id. at 210. 
230  See id. at 212. 
231  See id. at 207. 
232  See id. at 212–13. 
233  See id. at 213. 
234  See e.g., Prasad v. Cornell Univ., No. 5:15-CV-322, 2016 WL 3212079, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 24, 2016) (noting Cornell’s refusal to grant accused student five-day extension of time 
“to respond to the Investigative Report consisting of information gathered over several 
months’ of investigation,” despite deadline falling during final examination period). 
235  See U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX 
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 31–32 (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/do 
cs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/J552-AMZ3] (noting that the process includes 
“conducting the fact-finding investigation, holding a hearing . . . to determine whether the 
alleged sexual violence occurred and created a hostile environment, and determining what 
actions the school will take to eliminate the hostile environment . . . including imposing 
sanctions against the perpetrator and providing remedies for the complainant and school 
community, as appropriate”); see also U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 12 
(noting September 2017 withdrawal of the 2014 Q&A guidance). 
236  U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 235. 
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In 2015, a University of California, Davis student sought judicial relief af-
ter being suspended without a hearing.237 The university had not only barred the 
student from campus but also ordered him to stay out of Davis, California en-
tirely.238 Stating that “due process has completely been obliterated” by the uni-
versity’s conduct, the judge noted that “ ‘if anyone has failed the alleged victim 
in this case [it] is the University.’ ”239 The court ordered the plaintiff reinstated 
as a student.240 
In Prasad v. Cornell University, a 2016 decision in which the court denied 
a motion to dismiss claims filed against Cornell by a suspended student,241 the 
judge recited a variety of odd procedures that contributed to a perception of un-
fairness and justified allowing Prasad’s gender-discrimination claim to reach 
discovery.242 Among other things, the university (1) granted the complainant 
extensions of time but denied them to the accused; (2) prevented the accused 
from asking any questions of the complainant, even by submitting them to a 
hearing examiner for consideration; (3) relied upon a flawed “Investigative Re-
port” that misrepresented the statements of witnesses; and (4) determined the 
complainant’s blood-alcohol level on the night of the sexual activity at issue 
“based solely on [her] self-reported weight and alcohol consumption” and the 
assistance of an online BAC calculator, despite witness testimony suggesting 
that she could not possibly have been as drunk as the resulting numbers im-
plied.243 
In another 2016 decision, a federal court in Virginia recounted the slipshod 
process by which another “John Doe” was suspended from James Madison 
University.244 Doe was accused of sexual misconduct.245 Despite procedural 
hurdles, such as a prohibition on Doe receiving documents related to the case 
(he was allowed to read them and take notes, but could not take them with 
him), Doe convinced a university hearing board that he was “not responsible” 
(that is, not guilty).246 The alleged victim appealed the finding,247 and then the 
shoddy procedures began in earnest. The university allowed Doe’s accuser to 
state (in a document filed with the appellate board) that Doe had sexually as-
                                                        
237  See Press Release, Werksman Jackson Hathaway & Quinn, California Judge Issues 
Stinging Rebuke of UC Davis’ Handling of Title IX Sexual Misconduct Case (Oct. 12, 
2015). 
238  See id. (describing Sept. 22, 2015 hearing). 
239  See id. 
240  See id. 
241  Prasad v. Cornell Univ., No. 5:15-CV-322, 2016 WL 3212079, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 
2016). 
242  See id. at *14–*17. 
243  See id. at *8–*9, *15–*16, & *9 n.18 (noting that university officials decided that the 
complainant had a BAC of .33 or .43). 
244  See Doe v. Alger, 175 F. Supp. 3d 646, 648 (W.D. Va. 2016). 
245  See id. 
246  See id. at 651–52. 
247  See id. at 648. 
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saulted a different, unnamed student, and Doe had no opportunity to investigate 
the charge.248 Also, after the accuser claimed that her roommate had lied to the 
original hearing panel, the university prevented Doe from contacting the 
roommate, and the appellate hearing panel never sought evidence from the 
roommate.249 The university never informed Doe of the identity of the appellate 
board members, gave him no prior notice of the board’s meeting, and did not 
permit him to attend the meeting.250 The appellate board suspended Doe for 
five-and-one-half years, providing no explanation for its decision.251 Doe sued. 
Following discovery, during which Doe produced proof that the university had 
concealed further evidence from him that had been provided to the hearing 
board, the court granted summary judgment in Doe’s favor on the issue of lia-
bility, holding that “the undisputed facts show that Doe did not receive due 
process” and allowing him to re-enroll.252 
In 2015, a court ordered the University of California, San Diego to set 
aside its findings that a student had violated the university’s sexual misconduct 
rules, and the court required the university to set aside the sanction—
suspension for one year and a quarter—that it had imposed.253 The court’s opin-
ion listed several reasons that the university hearing was unfair to the accused 
student. Among other procedural defects, the hearing officer declined to ask the 
accused students’ suggested cross-examination questions of his accuser, includ-
ing questions the court later found material.254 The accuser testified from be-
hind a screen that prevented the accused from seeing her.255 Also, the university 
prosecutor referred in his closing argument to evidence not in the hearing rec-
                                                        
248  See id. at 652, 662. 
249  See id. at 651, 653, 662. At the original hearing, the roommate had “testified that she did 
not believe that Roe was drunk or otherwise incapacitated when she saw her shortly after her 
sexual encounter with Doe,” which contradicted the complainant’s version of the events. See 
id. (“she claimed that she was drunk during that encounter.”). 
250  See id. at 662. 
251  See id. at 653. 
252  See Doe v. Alger, 228 F. Supp. 3d 713, 716, 729 (W.D. Va. 2016); Doe v. Alger, No. 
5:15-CV-00035, 2017 WL 1483577, at *2 (W.D. Va. Apr. 25, 2017) (discussing scope of 
equitable relief awarded). 
253  Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.D., No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL, 2015 
WL 4394597, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015). 
254  The questions were proposed by the accused to the hearing officer, who chose which 
questions to ask. See id. at *2. (“The limiting of the questions in this case curtailed the right 
of confrontation crucial to any definition of a fair hearing.”). 
255  See id. at *3. For background on the permissibility of screening vulnerable witnesses in 
criminal cases, see generally Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022 (1988) (restricting such use); 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990) (allowing it in some circumstances). I mention 
these cases not to suggest that university hearings must mimic criminal courtrooms but in-
stead to flag the screening practice—which I am told is quite common on at least some cam-
puses—as one that will seem jarring to veterans of other venues of adjudication. 
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ord, which the factfinder then relied upon.256 Further, the university did not 
provide the accused student with records of witness interviews, including inter-
views of the accuser, conducted by university investigators, and it denied the 
accused the names of several witnesses.257 The trial court noted that the accused 
was entitled a fair hearing, “a real one, not a sham or a pretense,”258 and it held 
that the UCSD “hearing was unfair.”259 Later, the California Court of Appeal 
would overrule the trial court, holding that the UCSD procedures were not so 
terrible as to violate the constitutional rights of the accused student.260 After 
stating, “we are concerned that the procedure employed by UCSD has great po-
tential to be unfair to a student accused of violating the Sex Offense Policy,” 
the court concluded, “[t]hat said, on the record before us, we cannot say that the 
procedure used by UCSD violates due process.”261 
The upshot of decisions like the one in the UCSD case is that, under cur-
rent law, a great deal of questionable procedures may fall within the range of 
permissible options available to universities.262 If universities wish to admit 
hearsay—including double hearsay, in which the report of an absent investiga-
tor contains hearsay uttered by additional absent witnesses—they may.263 If 
universities wish to muzzle the lawyers hired by students, they may.264 If uni-
versities wish to deny discovery to students, they may.265 A university may 
even deny the accused copies of notes recounting interviews of the accuser, at 
least sometimes.266 
Legal, however, is not the same as sound. Justice Antonin Scalia is known 
for wishing judges would stamp “Stupid but constitutional!” on certain com-
plaints.267 Observers of the campus discipline world should similarly observe 
                                                        
256  See Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.D., 2015 WL 4394597, at *3 (holding that the 
factfinder “improperly delegates the panel’s duty to an outside witness that was not present 
at the hearing”). 
257  See id. 
258  See id. (quoting Ciechon v. City of Chi., 686 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
259  See id. at *6. 
260  See Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.D., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 479, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016). 
261  Id. at 519. 
262  See Doe v. Skidmore Coll., 152 A.D.3d 932, 935 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (listing various 
informal processes that universities may employ and then finding that university failed to 
follow its own rules). 
263  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.D., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 497. 
264  See infra Section III.F (discussing limitations on roles of lawyers at hearings). 
265  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.D., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513. (“There is no formal right 
to discovery in student conduct review hearings.”). 
266  See id. (noting that “the failure to turn over Dalcourt’s interview notes from her two 
meetings with Jane gives us pause. . . . [and] we can see, in certain circumstances, the need 
for such a requirement. In a case like the one before us, there are only two witnesses to the 
incident” but declining to find a violation in this case). 
267  See Obituary: Antonin Scalia, Always Right, ECONOMIST (Feb. 20, 2016), 
https://www.economist.com/news/obituary/21693161-originalist-chief-devout-and-
colourful-end-was-79-obituary-antonin-scalia [https://perma.cc/X9KB-999A]. 
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that many universities’ policies concurrently (1) are not so offensive to judges’ 
sense of fair play that they violate constitutional due process guarantees, yet (2) 
are lousy, risk unfairness, and ought to be changed. And on top of that, some 
are so bad that they violate the law—and must be changed whether universities 
want to or not. 
It may not be obvious how questionable procedures would exacerbate ra-
cial bias. Whatever one’s position on the use of hearsay in college hearings, the 
same evidence is generally admissible against students of all races. It could be 
that improving university procedures will affect all students in approximately 
the same way. I would suggest, however, that one purpose of well-crafted pro-
cedures is to help factfinders reach fair and accurate results. If implicit bias in-
fects the perceptions of victims, other witnesses, investigators, and factfinders, 
then the consequences of unfair and inaccurate decisions seem likely to hurt 
minority students in particular. The greater availability of lawyers to white stu-
dents—who tend to have more money than minority students—increases the 
risk that unsound procedures will fuel disparate impact. 
F. Lawyers for Students Have Limited Roles, and Lawyers Are Expensive 
When Shakespeare’s character Dick the Butcher suggests, “The first thing 
we do, let’s kill all the lawyers,”268 the playwright did not expect the audience 
to deem Dick a proponent of sound social policy.269 The old saying goes that 
there can be no liberty without law,270 and no law without lawyers,271 making 
the elimination of lawyers a goal of aspiring tyrants.272 The history of criminal 
trials provides further evidence of the importance of legal counsel, and Parlia-
ment acted back in the days of King William of Orange to rectify the injustices 
performed by the courts of King James II, whose “Hanging Judge,” George Jef-
                                                        
268  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH 61; see also Deb-
bie Vogel, ‘Kill the Lawyers,’ a Line Misinterpreted, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1990) (“Shake-
speare meant it as a compliment to attorneys and judges who instill justice in society.”). 
269  Dick is speaking to the rebel Jack Cade, who has been imagining his future reign as king 
of England. Cade replies, “[T]hat I mean to do” and laments how a “parchment [i.e., a legal 
document], being scribbled o’er, should undo a man” SHAKESPEARE, supra note 268. 
270  See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 232 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1960) 
(chapter on “The Origins of the Rule of Law”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 149 (Lee Ward ed., 1988) (“[W]here there is no law, there is no freedom”). 
271  Bar associations often reiterate this portion of the maxim, repeating it across the centuries 
worldwide. See, e.g., Joe Dinga Pefok, Cameroon Bar Protests Exclusion from State Issues, 
CAMEROON POSTLINE (May 23, 2016) http://www.cameroonpostline.com/cameroon-bar-
protests-exclusion-from-state-issues [https://perma.cc/W3Y2-AKA8] (quoting bar associa-
tion leader on lawyers: “They are the ones to ensure that justice reigns for all. In fact, if there 
are no lawyers, there will be no law.”); Robert A. Hunter, 22 LA. BAR ASS’N. REP. 12 (1921). 
272  Speakers at conventions of law professors add, “And there will be no lawyers without 
law schools.” See Barbara Elenbaas, Microsoft President Brad Smith Looks to the Future of 
Legal Education in AALS Plenary Address, ASS’N AM. L. SCH. (2017), 
https://www.aals.org/about/publications/newsletters/aals-news-winter-2017/aals-2017-plen 
ary-address [https://perma.cc/3T87-HPWZ]. 
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fries, oversaw the Bloody Assizes.273 The Treason Trials Act of 1696 provided 
that treason defendants could be represented by counsel, a right later extended 
to ordinary felony defendants.274 One need not analogize Title IX hearings to 
treason prosecutions—if for no reason other than that expulsion, sometimes 
called the “academic death penalty,”275 is only a metaphorical form of capital 
punishment—to understand that legal counsel might be useful to students ac-
cused of misconduct.276 
A recent case at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis 
(“IUPUI”) provides facts similar to those at many universities. Jeremiah Mar-
shall, an IUPUI sophomore, was accused of sexual assault and appeared at a 
university hearing.277 This is how a federal judge described who did what at the 
hearing: 
Ms. Hinton, a non-practicing attorney and cum laude graduate of the University 
of Notre Dame Law School, presented IUPUI’s case against Marshall, present-
ing evidence and questioning and cross-examining witnesses. In contrast, Mar-
shall was forced to represent himself at the hearing. IUPUI only allowed one of 
Marshall’s three attorneys to be present with him at the hearing, and the sole at-
torney was not permitted to speak on Marshall’s behalf.278 
IUPUI’s treatment of lawyers representing accused students is not unusual 
among universities, and the court reviewing Marshall’s due process challenge 
to the procedure reported accurately that under current law, universities gener-
ally have no duty to allow students’ lawyers to speak at hearings.279  
Some institutions restrict even further the activities of students’ lawyers. At 
Amherst College, accused students may hire private lawyers, but these lawyers 
are “required to remain outside of any hearing room,” even though the universi-
ty’s lawyers “may be present to provide legal counsel to the Chair and to the 
Hearing Board members.”280 Similarly, Stephens College allows students to 
bring a “support person” to hearings, but those persons “may not be external to 
the college community (i.e. parents or attorneys).”281 
                                                        
273  See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2005). 
274  Id. 
275  See, e.g., Rebecca Moore Howard, Plagiarisms, Authorships, and the Academic Death 
Penalty, 57 C. ENG. 788, 789 (1995). 
276  Counsel would also be useful to complainants seeking to vindicate their claims of victim-
ization. As discussed below, see infra Part V, the current system may also be biased against 
minority victims of campus crime (in addition to accused minority students), and limited ac-
cess to counsel could exacerbate this problem. 
277  See Marshall v. Ind. Univ., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1203–04 (S.D. Ind. 2016). 
278  Id. at 1204–05. Maria Hinton was Assistant Director of Student Conduct at IUPUI. See 
id. at 1204. 
279  See id. at 1207–08. 
280  Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 207 (D. Mass. 2017). 
281  See STEPHENS COLLEGE, STUDENT HANDBOOK 53 (discussing “support persons” in other 
college proceedings); id. at 119 (“The accused student is entitled to be assisted by and ac-
companied to the hearing by one member of the Stephens College faculty or staff as a sup-
port person.”). 
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Credible policy arguments have been advanced to support excluding law-
yers from university conduct hearings or limiting their roles in various ways, 
such as preventing them from questioning witnesses or from speaking at all. 
For example, advocates caution against “criminaliz[ing]” Title IX and argue 
that procedural protections appropriate for criminal trials have no place in uni-
versity hearings.282 They remind Title IX’s critics that restrictions on lawyers’ 
behavior are not unique to campus sexual assault allegations, sexual harassment 
cases, or other claims of discrimination.283 Instead, campus discipline hearings 
more generally tend to have limited roles for lawyers, perhaps because univer-
sities wish to avoid importing the elaborate procedures of real courts into the 
less formal hearing rooms at which colleges adjudicate allegations of plagia-
rism, underage drinking, and vandalism.284 Such arguments rebut well the con-
tention that campus sexual assault “respondents” should enjoy special proce-
dural protections unavailable to those accused of serious offenses unrelated to 
sex, such as hazing or even homicide.285 For purposes of this Article, I need not 
resolve the policy question of how robustly lawyers should be allowed to par-
ticipate in campus discipline hearings. Rather, I will make the more limited 
claim that robust participation by lawyers (whatever the offense at issue) might 
often prove helpful to accused students, which is why accused students request 
such active participation and why advocates for greater “due process” protec-
tions in campus hearings tend to raise the issue of lawyers for the accused. 
In considering this more limited claim—that is, that lawyers are indeed 
useful to accused students, and those able to obtain them are wise to do so—I 
would ask readers, whatever their opinion on my Article and on-campus adju-
dications more generally, to consider a hypothetical. If your child (or the child 
of a close friend) were accused of sexual assault on campus, and the child 
asked you whether it would make sense to hire a lawyer to protect the child’s 
interests, what would you say? If your answer is, “Yes, get a lawyer,” would 
you prefer that the presentation of evidence and the questioning of witnesses 
could be delegated to the lawyer, or would you prefer that those tasks be as-
signed to the youth accused of misconduct? Again, one need not agree that ac-
cused students should enjoy such assistance of counsel to understand why it 
might be helpful. If minority students are disproportionately accused of campus 
offenses, then any limitations on the role of lawyers for the accused will dis-
proportionately burden minority students.286 
                                                        
282  See Cantalupo, supra note 185, at 283. 
283  See id. at 286. 
284  See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to 
Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1985 (2016). 
285  See id. at 1997. 
286  Similarly, if minority students are disproportionately the victims of campus violence, the 
role of lawyers has additional implications. See infra Part V. 
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Further, other than at the very small number of universities that provide 
lawyers to accused students at the institution’s expense,287 students seeking le-
gal assistance must turn to private lawyers whom they may not be able to af-
ford.288 Because income and wealth are not evenly distributed among Ameri-
cans of all races, minority students are particularly likely to lack the money 
needed to hire a lawyer.289 If lawyers are helpful to accused students—even un-
der the constraints imposed by universities upon lawyers—and minority stu-
dents are less likely to have lawyers, then the university discipline system be-
comes that much more likely to have a disparate impact. 
G. Faculty and Administrators Who Might Normally Speak Up for Racial 
Justice Are Afraid to Undermine Title IX Enforcement, or to Appear Soft 
on Rape 
Given the real possibility that university discipline systems discriminate 
against minority students, one might wonder why more faculty members and 
administrators do not demand reform. After all, many faculty members and 
administrators take racial bias seriously and determinedly seek change on sev-
eral fronts, such as curricular reform, cultural competence training, campus 
climate initiatives, and the recruitment of a more diverse faculty and student 
body.290 A few answers suggest themselves: Perhaps the secretive and legalistic 
nature of university discipline processes deter public complaints, or perhaps the 
heavy-handed intervention of federal officials makes campus resistance seem 
futile.291 To me, two other possibilities loom large: First, faculty members and 
administrators likely are largely unaware of the potential disparate racial impact 
described in this Article, which exists to promote greater attention to the prob-
lem. Second, those academics aware of the issue may fear undermining—or 
even appearing to undermine—efforts to promote gender equity and combat 
campus sexual assault. Lack of awareness perhaps can be cured. But awareness 
                                                        
287  See Ariel Kaminer, New Factor in Campus Sexual Assault Cases: Counsel for the Ac-
cused, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/nyregion/new-
factor-in-campus-sexual-assault-cases-counsel-for-the-accused.html 
[https://perma.cc/TDD6-GDXX]. 
288  See id. (“But success does not come cheaply. Litigating a case through a trial could cost 
$100,000. . . .”). 
289  See Michal Grinstein-Weiss et al., Racial Disparities in Education Debt Burden among 
Low- and Moderate-Income Households, BROOKINGS INST., (Apr. 29, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/racial-disparities-in-education-debt-burden-among-low-
and-moderate-income-households-2 [https://perma.cc/96NH-VZ2L]. 
290  See, e.g., Andrew M. Duehren & Daphne C. Thompson, In Debate Over Names, History 
and Race Relations Collide, HARV. CRIMSON (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.thecrimson.com/art 
icle/2016/1/19/faust-name-title-changes- [https://perma.cc/D3QK-8TVL]; Katherine Man-
gan, After Missouri’s Leadership Exodus, Hard Questions Loom on Race, Power, and Cul-
ture, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.chronicle.com/article/After-
Missouri-s-Leadership/234145 [https://perma.cc/KKY9-QC9W]; see also supra text accom-
panying notes 135–141 (describing efforts at universities to promote racial equality). 
291  See supra Section III.D; infra Section V. 
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will not suffice if knowledgeable academics avoid difficult conversations about 
substantive policy decisions. 
The experience of Professor Laura Kipnis, who teaches media studies at 
Northwestern University and objected to certain university rules concerning 
professor-student dating,292 has certainly encouraged shyness in the academy. 
After publishing an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education that discussed 
an ongoing Title IX case at Northwestern, in which a student had accused a 
professor of sexual harassment and which had been widely reported in the 
press,293 Kipnis found herself among the accused.294 She was cleared of wrong-
doing after elaborate proceedings, and she wrote a book about her case and the 
regulation of campus sex more generally.295 A graduate student mentioned in 
the book has sued Kipnis for defamation.296 On the one hand, Kipnis’s story 
seems like it could have been scripted by opponents of the Title IX status quo 
seeking to make the whole system look silly, humorless, and dangerous. Her 
attackers have given Kipnis attention and credibility, and she discusses in her 
book how, after she was charged with creating a “hostile environment,” 
strangers from all over America contacted her with material for her brief oppos-
ing what she describes as a “moral panic” comparable to McCarthyism and the 
“Satanic ritual abuse preschool trials of the 1980s.”297 On the other hand, who 
needs that kind of hassle?298 It is one thing to support free expression on cam-
pus in general, and quite another to wish that students will use their free speech 
rights to protest you in particular. 
Not all repercussions arising from opposition to the current university dis-
cipline enforcement system are as dramatic as lawsuits and charges of campus 
misconduct. Critics also face garden-variety accusations of joining the 
“[b]acklash to progress in the context of sexual assault”299 and “undermin[ing] 
Title IX’s central purpose: to protect and promote equal educational opportuni-
                                                        
292  See Laura Kipnis, Sexual Paranoia Strikes Academe, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 27, 
2015), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Sexual-Paranoia-Strikes/190351 [https://perma.cc/ 
73MU-B29U]. 
293  See id. 
294  See Laura Kipnis, My Title IX Inquisition, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 29, 2015), 
http://www.chronicle.com/article/My-Title-IX-Inquisition/230489 [https://perma.cc/K4AN-
54P9]. 
295  See KIPNIS, supra note 90, at 5–6. 
296  See Katherine Mangan, Laura Kipnis Is Sued over Portrayal of Graduate Student in 
Book on Campus ‘Sexual Paranoia’, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 18, 2017), 
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Laura-Kipnis-Is-Sued-Over/240105 [https://perma.cc/3KJ 
C-TKD9]. 
297  See KIPNIS, supra note 90, at 1. 
298  I will admit some personal concern on this score. Yet, if the tenured faculty won’t write 
articles that annoy people in the service of prompting difficult conversations, who will? 
299  See Anderson, supra note 284, at 1981–82 (“In general, the resistance to progressive re-
form of campus sexual assault has mirrored the backlash to the progressive reform of rape 
law. . . .”); Johnson, supra note 3, at 58 (“In many ways, this response mirrors the wave of 
criticism levied at progressive reform of rape law in the criminal justice system.”). 
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ty for all students.”300 In response to authors who raise the premise of this Arti-
cle—that is, that adopting “OCR’s policies . . . will lead to a disparate impact 
against men of color, particularly black men”—one commentator raised “the 
question of whether the invocation of race comes from a place of genuine con-
cern or a place of convenience.”301 I do not mean to overstate the consequences 
of having one’s racial justice bona fides questioned by a law review author; the 
distinguished scholars whose “invocation of race” was questioned will do just 
fine and are not likely to face dismissal from the Harvard Law School faculty. 
But not everyone has tenure or a judicial pension, and legal scholars desiring 
tranquility might wish to focus on something other than campus sex regulation. 
Outside law school walls, faculty in other disciplines—who do speak up from 
time to time about university governance—might also direct their attention to 
other topics because of a desire (perhaps conscious, perhaps not) to avoid accu-
sations of supporting rape culture.302 
Observers of campus culture will note a great overlap among faculty mem-
bers and administrators who agitate for reforms promoting gender equity and 
those who agitate for reforms promoting racial equality. As a result, many aca-
demics who might otherwise be most sympathetic to a race-based critique of 
campus policy will be hesitant to choose this particular fight. 
H. Investigations of Alleged Sexual Misconduct Are Affected by Collective 
American Attitudes toward Race and Sex 
In addition to all the factors listed above that contribute to the risk of dis-
parate racial impact in university disciplinary systems, one factor merits in-
creasing attention as universities devote more resources to policing and adjudi-
cating campus sex. American law has stigmatized sexual relations between 
black men and white women since before American independence.303 When 
black male students are accused of sexual misconduct toward white female stu-
dents,304 investigators and factfinders will bring to the table centuries of cultural 
baggage. Professor Halley has listed cultural touchstones familiar to students of 
American racial history: Emmet Till, the Central Park Five, and To Kill a 
                                                        
300  See Cantalupo, supra note 185, at 284. 
301  See Johnson, supra note 3, at 59–60, 59 n.24, 60 n.28. Nancy Gertner is a retired federal 
judge and a senior lecturer on law at Harvard. Janet Halley is the Royall Professor of Law at 
Harvard. 
302  See Margo Kaplan, Rape Beyond Crime, 66 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1065 (2017) (discussing 
concept of “rape culture”); Mary Graw Leary, Affirmatively Replacing Rape Culture with 
Consent Culture, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2016) (discussing use of Title IX to com-
bat rape culture on campus). 
303  See IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF 
RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA 41 (2016) (discussing penalties imposed by colonial legislatures 
on white women who had sex with black men). 
304  For an example of such a case in which the disciplined student eventually sued the uni-
versity for racial discrimination, see supra notes 107–115 and accompanying text. 
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Mockingbird.305 I would add Loving v. Virginia.306 Mildred Loving died just a 
decade ago, and she was only sixty-eight.307 These days we cheerfully recall 
that the Supreme Court of the United States decided Loving unanimously. One 
year earlier, however, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had also acted 
unanimously. It affirmed the conviction of Mildred and Richard Loving for vio-
lating “the Virginia statutes relating to miscegenetic marriages,”308 supporting 
the opinion of the trial judge, who stated: “Almighty God created the races 
white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. 
And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for 
such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not in-
tend for the races to mix.”309 Yes, half a century has transpired since then. But 
few will dispute that even fifty-plus years after Loving, interracial couples are 
not treated identically to same-race couples in the United States. Universities 
understand this truth, which is confirmed by social science research, including 
studies of college students.310 This knowledge spurs efforts to train students 
(and faculty and staff) in greater cultural competency. 
University researchers know that Americans perceive sexual relationships 
differently depending on the races of the participants. Historians know how 
Americans have treated interracial couples in the past. Law faculty members 
teach how attitudes toward race affect the criminal justice system today and ex-
plain in part how so many black men have been wrongfully convicted of rape. 
Psychologists know that interracial relationships arouse disproportionate dis-
gust in observers, despite surveys in which respondents claim to approve of in-
terracial marriage. It would be bizarre if administrators in charge of university 
disciplinary systems expected their results to be untainted by racial bias when 
they adjudicate accusations of nonconsensual interracial sex, interracial sexual 
harassment, and similar violations of university rules. That said, the limited da-
ta now available do not allow anyone to determine what percentage of campus 
sexual misconduct cases involve complainants and respondents of different 
races. Because the race of victims and defendants have proven so important to 
outcomes in the criminal justice system,311 this form of racial bias merits fur-
ther investigation on campus. 
                                                        
305  See Halley, supra note 3, at 106. 
306  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
307  See Douglas Martin, Mildred Loving, Who Battled Ban on Mixed-Race Marriage, Dies at 
68, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/06/us/06loving.html 
[https://perma.cc/JWR3-4YD8]. 
308  See Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 80 (Va. 1966). 
309  Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. 
310  See, e.g., Allison L. Skinner & Caitlin M. Hudac, “Yuck, You Disgust Me!” Affective Bi-
as Against Interracial Couples, 68 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 68, 68 (2016) (“Overall, 
the current findings provide evidence that interracial couples elicit disgust and are dehuman-
ized relative to same-race couples.”). 
311  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“few of the 
details of the crime or of McCleskey’s past criminal conduct were more important [to 
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
To begin addressing the likely existence of widespread racially disparate 
impact in college and university student discipline, I suggest two responses. 
First, colleges and universities should begin collecting and publishing data sim-
ilar to that produced by K–12 institutions for inclusion in the Civil Rights Data 
Collection (CRDC) maintained by the U.S. Department of Education.312 The 
Office for Civil Rights should mandate such reporting and should then publish 
the data. Second, whoever on campus is in charge of combating racial bias and 
discrimination in general should acknowledge this issue and use whatever 
measures would be considered appropriate to respond to other manifestations 
racial injustice. 
A. Collect Data, and Make It Public 
With a few clicks, anyone with internet access can obtain a CRDC “Disci-
pline Report” for a K–12 school district or an individual school. These reports 
reveal the race and ethnicity of students receiving disciplinary actions such as 
in-school suspensions, out-of-school suspensions, and expulsions. For example, 
at David H. Hickman High School, for which my Columbia, Missouri neigh-
borhood is currently zoned, 117 out-of-school suspensions were recorded dur-
ing the 2013–2014 survey year.313 The school’s overall population of 1,786 
students was 18.5 percent black, and the population of students receiving out-
of-school suspensions was 63.2 percent black.314 Because these figures are easi-
ly accessible (I obtained them in less than a minute), the Columbia Daily Trib-
une has been able to report on racial bias in the local school district’s discipline 
regime with facts, instead of guesswork and opinion.315 And the newspaper has 
rich data to review instead of mere anecdotes. These newspaper articles helped 
to inspire public interest in the reported racial disparities. Further, the mere ex-
                                                                                                                                 
whether he would be executed] than the fact that his victim was white”); see also Hetey & 
Eberhardt, supra note 81 at 1949 (discussing effect of defendant’s appearance on punish-
ment imposed). Note too that if the victim’s race affects enforcement decisions on campus 
(as it does in the criminal justice system), then minority students may receive inadequate 
protection. See infra Part V. 
312  For background on the CRDC, see Office for Civil Rights, Civil Rights Data Collection 
(CRDC), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/data.html [https://perma.cc/CY88-AD 
2N]. 
313  See David H. Hickman High, Discipline Report, Office of Civil Rights, Civil Rights Data 
Collection (2013), https://ocrdata.ed.gov/Page?t=s&eid=255949&syk=7&pid=2268&sr=1& 
Report=6 [https://perma.cc/Q6S2-PP6L]. 
314  Id. 
315  See Catherine Martin, Black Students Still Get Most Suspensions in Columbia Public 
Schools, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Sept. 9, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.columbiatribune.com/ 
1b6ebf38-197b-11e3-a45d-10604b9f6eda.html [https://perma.cc/8ARW-X4LN]; Roger 
McKinney, Black and Low-Income Students More Frequently Suspended from School, 
COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Dec. 28, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.columbiatribune.com/e126a57 
e-da88-5f54-ad51-0e152afd24fc.html [https://perma.cc/NP7A-WGD3]. 
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istence of the data—even if never reported in the media—allows district admin-
istrators and Board of Education members to understand the extent of the prob-
lem in their jurisdiction. When I served on the Policy Committee of the Board 
of Education,316 I participated in discussions about racial bias that likely would 
have been impossible absent the CRDC data. At least in part because of the ex-
istence of CRDC reports accessible to the community, the school district im-
plemented measures designed to reduce bias.317 These efforts may work, and 
they may not. Fortunately, future CRDC surveys will help administrators, 
Board of Education members, and the public to find out. Also, because every 
school district in the country collects and reports the same information,318 one 
can compare results among jurisdictions and against national trends. 
By contrast, during my term as chair of the campus-wide Faculty Council 
at the University of Missouri,319 I had no way of evaluating whether Mizzou’s 
student discipline system produced racial bias at greater or lesser rates than 
peer institutions and national averages. I appointed two committees that exam-
ined the equity resolution process at the university and offered suggestions for 
reform, many of which were adopted.320 These committees did important work, 
and their suggestions have made real improvements to a complicated system. I 
realized at some point while the committees were working that I had no idea 
whether Mizzou’s student discipline system (of which the equity resolution 
process is only a part),321 produced racially disparate outcomes. I can easily 
find data on discipline at Missouri’s elementary and secondary schools, as well 
as in its criminal justice system, that allow me to examine racial disparities. But 
if I wish to compare the student disciplinary systems at Mizzou to those at Mis-
souri State, Washington University, and other universities, hardly any data are 
publicly available. 
                                                        
316  I served as a community member of the committee from 2013 to 2016. I was not a mem-
ber of the Board of Education. 
317  See Martin, supra note 315 (“This year, the district is also looking to start restorative jus-
tice. The practice focuses on alternative disciplinary actions that don’t remove the students 
from the traditional school setting.”); McKinney, supra note 315 (discussing equity training 
of district personnel and teaching “with poverty in mind”). 
318  The CRDC is a mandatory program for schools receiving federal funds, authorized under 
the statutes and regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as well as 
under other law, such as Title IX). See 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(b) (2016); 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 
(2016). 
319  I was chair from 2015 to 2017. 
320  See Ad Hoc Committee on Civil Rights and Title IX, Report from the MU Faculty Coun-
cil on University Policy (Apr. 4, 2017) (on file with author) (reviewing recommendations of 
previous ad hoc committee, acknowledging acceptance of some proposals by university ad-
ministration, and advocating additional changes). 
321  Offenses unrelated to discrimination are handled separately. Different university officials 
adjudicate charges of academic dishonesty, as well as misbehavior such as underage drink-
ing. 
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The U.S. Department of Education should use its authority under Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act322 to require that colleges and universities immediately 
begin collecting the sort of data already reported by elementary and secondary 
schools to the CRDC. If public schools across the country can manage this task, 
higher education institutions—which already prepare all sorts of reports to sat-
isfy requirements associated with federal funding—should be able to manage. 
At a minimum, colleges and universities should collect demographic data (in-
cluding race/ethnicity, sex, disability status,323 and income324) for all students 
receiving suspension and expulsion. It would be helpful if the data could be 
disaggregated by offense (perhaps with broad categories such as academic dis-
honesty, equity/discrimination violations, and drug/alcohol abuse), thereby al-
lowing one to examine whether racial bias is more prevalent in discipline for 
some offenses than for others. Even better would be data that track de-
mographics of both complainants and respondents, including for cases in which 
no discipline is imposed. 
Although I believe that the U.S. Department of Education should require 
the submission of this information by colleges and universities receiving feder-
al funds,325 which would necessitate the establishment of uniform metrics, I 
hope that colleges and university leaders can get ahead of federal demands and 
begin crafting their own lists of desired data.326 Administrators might call upon 
                                                        
322  Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in educa-
tion programs or activities which receive federal assistance. The DOE OCR enforces Title 
VI against educational institutions, including universities. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
EDUCATION AND TITLE VI, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/hq43e4.html 
[https://perma.cc/SBW5-FRXW]. 
323  At the K–12 level, disability status is measured by whether someone is an “IDEA stu-
dent,” which refers to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. At the post-secondary 
level, one might consider whether a student has received disability-related accommodations 
for coursework or examinations. 
324  At the K-12 level, income status is tracked by recording which students are eligible for 
free or reduced-price school lunches. See McKinney, supra note 315. At the post-secondary 
level, one might use eligibility for Pell Grants. 
325  In an earlier draft of this Article, I suggested that “while the Department is considering 
this issue, it might wish to scrap or amend the ‘60-calendar day timeframe’ mentioned in 
previous DOE guidance, see supra note 235 and accompanying text, that has inspired so 
much haste on the part of university officials. A bit more time could lead to greater fairness 
and accuracy.” The DOE OCR subsequently released a guidance document that appears to 
have effected this change. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS , Q&A ON 
CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 3 (2017) (asking “What time frame constitutes a ‘prompt’ 
investigation?” and answering “There is no fixed time frame under which a school must 
complete a Title IX investigation.”). Additional guidance, yet to be released, may make more 
clear how “OCR will evaluate a school’s good faith effort to conduct a fair, impartial inves-
tigation in a timely manner.” Id. 
326  In addition, while DOE leaders are considering whether to require data collection by all 
colleges and universities receiving federal funds, in the meantime OCR staff could begin in-
cluding data collection mandates in voluntary resolution agreements that the department 
reaches with institutions accused of Title IX or Title VI violations. For discussion of such an 
agreement, see supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text. 
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their diversity and equity officers, who could, in turn, enlist assistance from the 
National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education and from 
ATIXA, the Association of Title IX Administrators. Presidents and chancellors 
might also consult their general counsels, who could contact the National Asso-
ciation of College and University Attorneys for guidance. Student affairs pro-
fessionals, who run most campus discipline systems, could advise about offense 
categories. Regardless of whether campus leaders offer suggestions, the De-
partment of Education should promulgate reporting requirements and should 
make the resulting data available online, either in the CRDC or in a similar da-
tabase.327 Uniform reporting standards will allow apples-to-apples comparisons 
across institutions. 
B. Anti-Bias Trainers, Train Thyselves 
Meanwhile, as we wait for data reports to populate the post-secondary stu-
dent discipline database, colleges and universities can begin attacking the prob-
lem. Scholars and administrators across America have devoted themselves to 
promoting fairness and equity in higher education, publishing research on mat-
ters such as reducing campus sexual violence,328 encouraging intervention 
against anti-LGBT discrimination,329 promoting success by black men in STEM 
fields,330 and encouraging persistence among students with disabilities enrolled 
in online graduate programs.331 I will not presume to instruct these experts on 
their work but will instead entreat them to consider whether I have raised a real 
problem related to their bailiwick, and, if so, how they might use their 
knowledge and campus influence to respond. 
Lest I be accused of not offering any potential solutions, however, I will 
offer a few ideas that can perhaps be added to whatever proposals may be 
forthcoming from elsewhere. To begin, colleges and universities might review 
the factors discussed above in Part IV, some of which may be, at least in part, 
susceptible to intervention by campus leaders. For example, to reduce the effect 
of implicit bias on those who make decisions related to student discipline, col-
leges and universities may wish to develop training modules similar to those 
already offered to hiring committee members and others in the campus com-
                                                        
327  Further discussion of what sort of information should be collected appears in U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC., Guiding Principles: A Resource Guide for Improving School Climate and Disci-
pline 17 (2014) (discussing best data-collection practices at the elementary and secondary 
school level). 
328  See, e.g., Chris Linder et al., From Margins to Mainstream: Social Media as a Tool for 
Campus Sexual Violence Activism, 9 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 231, 231 (2016). 
329  See, e.g., Adrienne B. Dessel et al., LGBT Discrimination on Campus and Heterosexual 
Bystanders: Understanding Intentions to Intervene, 10 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 101, 101 
(2017). 
330  See, e.g., Marybeth Gasman et al., Black Male Success in STEM: A Case Study of More-
house College, 10 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 181, 181 (2017). 
331  See, e.g., Susana Verdinelli & Debbi Kutner, Persistence Factors Among Online Gradu-
ate Students with Disabilities, 9 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER EDUC. 353, 353 (2016). 
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munity.332 Those involved in equity resolution processes—who often lead train-
ing sessions for others—should be especially open to education concerning 
their own biases because of their appreciation for the importance of such self-
examination.333 Colleges and universities might also benefit from reviewing 
their student conduct rules for provisions that are unduly broad and vague, es-
pecially rules related to sexual activity and harassment.334 It is not for me to de-
cide how an institution should define “consent,” “stalking,” and other terms in 
its rulebook. Whatever the definitions, however, they should be clearly articu-
lated in documents available to students and campus officials who adjudicate 
cases.335 Institutions allowing accused students (and complainants, for that mat-
ter) to enlist the assistance of counsel should consider providing free legal ser-
vices to students who cannot otherwise afford lawyers.336 These advisors will 
be helpful even at campuses prohibiting lawyers from speaking at hearings. 
Finally, simply by acknowledging the likely existence of racial biases in 
the student discipline system, campus diversity officers and Title IX adminis-
trators can reduce the stigma that might otherwise attach to criticisms leveled 
against university offices dedicated to combating sexual violence.337 If concerns 
about racial injustice are derided as subterfuge offered to justify the speaker’s 
probable disdain for robust responses to campus rape, constructive discussions 
are unlikely to ensue. If instead we are willing to walk and chew gum concur-
rently, we can take sexual violence seriously while also accepting our duty to 
reduce racial injustice. 
Further advice is available in guidance the U.S. Department of Education 
has issued to elementary and secondary schools.338 In “Guiding Principles: A 
Resource Guide for Improving School Climate and Discipline,” the Department 
offers several ways in which schools can “prevent, identify, reduce, and elimi-
nate discriminatory discipline and unintended consequences.”339 One sugges-
tion is that schools use “proactive, data-driven, and continuous efforts, includ-
ing gathering feedback from families, students, teachers, and school 
personnel.”340 Because of the immense burdens already placed upon campus 
                                                        
332  See supra Section III.B. 
333  Some useful material may be available from the American Bar Association, which pre-
pares anti-bias curricula for judges and lawyers. See generally Implicit Bias Initiative, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-
bias.html [https://perma.cc/VJ8K-S8G2] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
334  See supra Section III.C. 
335  Relatedly, university documents analogous to case reporters—that describe campus dis-
cipline cases in some detail but without information that would allow identification of indi-
vidual students—could help observers see how these rules apply in practice. 
336  See supra Section III.F. 
337  See supra Section III.G. 
338  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
339  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 327, at 16. These suggestions overlap in part, but not 
entirely, with ideas mentioned above. 
340  Id. at 17–18. 
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offices charged with enforcing civil rights law, it is not reasonable to expect 
equity officers to gather all this data and feedback without assistance. Offices 
already responsible for institutional research should help to gather and maintain 
the needed data, and university leaders can help establish campus equivalents 
of the “school discipline team” recommended for K-12 schools.341 Faculty and 
student government groups could nominate representatives for a team that  
may choose to examine how discipline referrals and sanctions imposed at the 
school compare to those at other schools, or randomly review a percentage of 
the disciplinary actions taken at each school on an ongoing basis to ensure that 
actions taken were non-discriminatory and consistent with the school’s disci-
pline practices.342  
These are simply suggestions, and they were not written with colleges and 
universities in mind. Nonetheless, the experience of K-12 administrators seek-
ing to reduce disproportionate disciplinary practices in their schools likely has 
much to offer campus leaders with the same goals. 
V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH 
The main point of this Article—that colleges and universities, as well as 
the U.S. Department of Education, should act to reduce the disproportionate 
campus discipline of minority students—suggests a variety of possible further 
research. Topics worthy of additional scholarly attention include (1) possible 
effects of campus discipline on already divergent retention rates of students of 
different races; (2) how the regulation of campus conduct nationwide by federal 
officials is a form of “shadow law,” in which agency staff regulate outside the 
formal regulatory process; (3) how federal influence on campus conduct rules 
and adjudication procedures exemplifies the declining influence of faculty on 
university governance; (4) whether complainants and other student victims of 
misconduct receive disparate treatment on the basis of race and, if so, what in-
stitutions can do to remedy the problem; and (5) how potentially competing 
claims for justice by different disadvantaged groups can be better examined 
through the lens of intersectionality. I will address each of these topics quite 
briefly here. With luck, other scholars can eventually give them the more robust 
attention they deserve. 
Retention rates. Black students already graduate from college at lower 
rates than white students,343 and university leaders should look carefully at 
campus policies that could exacerbate this problem. Not only expulsions but 
also less severe punishments can prevent graduation. For example, a student 
suspended for a year or two may never return. Students with fewer financial re-
                                                        
341  See id. at 17. 
342  Id. at 17–18. 
343  D. SHAPIRO ET AL., SIGNATURE 12 SUPPLEMENT: COMPLETING COLLEGE: A NATIONAL 
VIEW OF STUDENT ATTAINMENT RATES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY–FALL 2010 COHORT 21 
(2017) (“Among students who started in four-year public institutions, black students had the 
lowest six-year completion rate (45.9 percent).”). 
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sources are particularly at risk of having a suspension become a permanent de-
parture from school, especially if they forfeit tuition already paid for the semes-
ter during which a suspension becomes effective. If scholarships are revoked 
upon findings of misconduct, that would compound the effect on students with 
limited means. 
Shadow Law. Administrative law scholars sometimes use the term “shadow 
law” to refer to agency use of informal methods to administer federal law.344 
Shadow law tools, such as policy statements and interpretive rules, allow agen-
cies to regulate without engaging in the formal “notice and comment” process 
generally required for federal regulations.345 In recent years the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education has used a great deal of shadow law—including “Dear Col-
league” letters and other guidance documents—to regulate how colleges and 
universities adjudicate student conduct cases. While the guidance concerning 
burden of proof may have attracted the most attention,346 DOE has gone well 
beyond mandating (or even strongly encouraging) the adoption of certain pro-
cedures. In enforcing Title IX against universities, DOE OCR officials have re-
quired that universities change the definitions of student conduct offenses.347 
Whatever the merits of various university policies created and amended pursu-
ant to DOE diktat, scholars may wish to consider whether federal shadow law 
should regulate sexual practices—among other behavior—of millions of peo-
ple. 
Declining faculty influence. The rapid amendment of student conduct rules 
and procedures in response to federal agency demands illustrates the waning 
power of faculty more generally. Scholars of higher education have observed 
that the prestige and power of university faculty members have declined signif-
icantly since the heady decades following World War II.348 On campuses at 
which faculty have tried to slow or stop the adoption of rules written in re-
sponse to DOE guidance, administrators have enacted them anyway. At Har-
vard Law School, for example, the due process concerns raised by law faculty 
did not stop the university from agreeing to adopt new rules demanded by 
                                                        
344  See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public 
Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 277, 279 (1998). 
345  See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (“After notice required by this section, the agency shall give 
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of 
written data, views, or arguments. . . .”). 
346  See Tamara Rice Lave, Ready, Fire, Aim: How Universities Are Failing the Constitution 
in Sexual Assault Cases, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 642 (2016); Amy Chmielewski, Note, De-
fending the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in College Adjudications of Sexual As-
sault, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 143–44 (2013). 
347  See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text (documenting how DOE caused the Uni-
versity of New Mexico to change its definition of sexual harassment, relying upon its own 
Dear Colleague letter as authority). 
348  See generally MARTIN J. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., THE FACULTY FACTOR: REASSESSING THE 
AMERICAN ACADEMY IN A TURBULENT ERA 15–16, 299–306 (2016). 
18 NEV. L.J. 107, TRACHTENBERG - FINAL 12/14/17  5:53 PM 
Fall 2017] UNIVERSITY TITLE IX ENFORCEMENT 163 
DOE.349 The DOE press release noted the “strong leadership” of the law dean 
and university president who adopted policies—such as the “preponderance of 
the evidence” standard and new rules concerning appeals—over vehement fac-
ulty objection.350 Whatever system one might prefer for campus discipline cas-
es, there was once a day in which faculty members would design it. Those days 
have departed. 
Possible disparate treatment of victims by race. As mentioned in the Intro-
duction, this Article focuses on the likely disparate treatment of college and 
university students accused of misconduct and does not devote much attention 
to possible disparate treatment of complainants and other victims. The treat-
ment of victims, however, merits serious attention. First, victims who do not 
receive appropriate responses from colleges and universities are at risk of leav-
ing school or otherwise enjoying lesser access to educational opportunities. Se-
cond, if victims of different races are treated differently, institutions send a ter-
rible message about their commitment to racial equality. Because students of 
different races may have different attitudes toward campus police and other in-
stitutional officials, college and university leaders should consider how best to 
encourage reporting by assault victims from disadvantaged populations. They 
should also consider how to provide resources that serve students of all back-
grounds. 
Intersectionality. Finally, the issues presented in this Article raise poten-
tially competing claims for justice by disadvantaged groups—that is, minority 
men concerned about racial bias in campus discipline processes, and women 
seeking protection from sexual violence. This is an oversimplification of the 
issue, but the tension is real. Most Title IX respondents are men, and racial bias 
in the adjudication of student conduct will injure black men most of all. Con-
currently, most campus sexual assault complainants are women, and any criti-
cism of Title IX enforcement can be seen as an impediment to long-overdue 
efforts to protect women from campus predation. Similar tension has been ob-
served during efforts to reform the adjudication of rape in criminal courts, with 
some critics arguing that new evidentiary rules designed to help prosecutors 
win cases risked the wrongful conviction of minority men.351 Another observer, 
the member of Congress who led the effort to enact the new rules, called them 
“a triumph for the public—for the women who will not be raped and the chil-
                                                        
349  See Elizabeth Bartholet et al., supra note 91 (listing concerns of faculty). 
350  Harvard Law School Found in Violation of Title IX, Agrees to Remedy Sexual Harass-
ment, Including Sexual Assault of Students, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., (Dec. 30, 2014), 
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/harvard-law-school-found-violation-title-ix-agrees-
remedy-sexual-harassment-including-sexual-assault-students [https://perma.cc/KP8D-AX 
5M]. 
351  See, e.g., Baker, supra note 17, at 592 (“Poor, minority men with an alleged prior record 
will be much more likely to be falsely identified, improperly tried, and wrongfully convicted 
for stranger rapes that they did not commit.”). 
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dren who will not be molested.”352 The rules continue to inspire scholarly de-
bate decades later.353 
As discussions ensue among campus administrators, faculty, students, and 
others with an interest in how universities regulate student conduct—
particularly sexual misconduct—it may prove wise to consider intersectional 
analyses.354 As Professor Crenshaw has discussed, women of color are not 
simply women who happen to be members of minority groups, nor are they 
members of minority groups who happen to be women. Instead, their “intersec-
tional identities . . . as women of color” yield oppression not fully addressed by 
anti-racism and anti-sexism efforts alone.355 
When campus leaders move to ameliorate racial injustice in college and 
university discipline systems, they should seek feedback from diverse constitu-
encies, thereby increasing the odds that pursuing justice for one group does not 
cause harm to another. Robust action against campus sexual assault need not 
require racial injustice, and colleges and universities should prove able to re-
spond to the problem identified in this Article without hindering appropriate 
enforcement of well-written campus rules.  
CONCLUSION 
College and university disciplinary procedures almost certainly excessively 
punish black students, along with members of other disadvantaged minority 
groups. Campus leaders should act now to collect demographic data that would 
allow analysis of how their discipline systems affect students of different races. 
Further, using its authority under the Civil Rights Act, the U.S. Department of 
Education should mandate the collection of this data and should establish na-
tionwide standards for data reporting so that students, faculty, administrators, 
and the public can compare one institution with another. Concurrently, colleges 
and universities should act to reduce the effect of implicit bias on the student 
discipline process, along with other factors that contribute to disparate impact. 
                                                        
352  See 140 CONG. REC. H23,602 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Susan Moli-
nari) (discussing Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415). 
353  See, e.g., Tamara Rice Lave & Aviva Orenstein, Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A 
Critical Look at the Admission of Prior Sex Crimes, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 795, 795 (2013). 
354  See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1241–42 (1991). 
355  See id. at 1243–44. For earlier thoughts on intersectionality—in writings not using that 
term of art—see BAYARD RUSTIN, Black Women and Women’s Liberation, in TIME ON TWO 
CROSSES: THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF BAYARD RUSTIN 256–57 (Devon W. Carbado & 
Donald Weise eds., 2003) (discussing, among other topics, the role of gay men such as Rus-
tin in the civil rights movement and the relationship of black women to mainstream feminist 
activism); see also id. at 284, Black and Gay in the Civil Rights Movement: An Interview 
with Open Hands (“Goodness gracious! You’re a socialist, you’re a conscientious objector, 
you’re gay, you’re black, how many jeopardies can you afford?”). 
